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Abstract
The year 2017 marked an inflection point in the evolution of social norms regarding
sexual harassment. While victims of workplace harassment had long suffered in silence, the
surfacing of serious sexual misconduct allegations against Hollywood producer Harvey
Weinstein encouraged many more victims to tell their personal stories of abuse. These
scandals have spread beyond Hollywood to the rest of corporate America, leading to the
departures of several high-profile executives as well as sharp stock price declines at a number
of firms. In the past year, shareholders at four publicly traded companies have filed lawsuits
alleging that corporate directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties or violated
federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals at those firms. More
such suits are likely to follow in the months and years ahead.
In this Article, we examine the role of corporate and securities law in regulating and
remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We specify the conditions under which corporate
fiduciaries can be held liable to shareholders under state corporation law for perpetrating
sexual misconduct or allowing it to occur at their firms. We also discuss the circumstances
under which federal securities law requires issuers to disclose sexual misconduct allegations
against top executives and to reveal payments made to settle sexual misconduct claims. After
building a doctrinal framework for analyzing potential liability, we consider the strategic and
normative implications of using corporate and securities law as tools to address workplacebased sexual misconduct. We conclude that corporate and securities law can serve to
publicize the scope and severity of sexual harassment, incentivize proactive and productive
interventions by corporate fiduciaries, and punish individuals and entities that commit,
conceal, and abet sexual misconduct in the workplace. But we also address the potential
discursive and distributional implications of using laws designed to protect shareholders as
tools to regulate sexual harassment. We end by emphasizing the promise as well as the
pitfalls of corporate law as a catalyst for organizational and social change.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CORPORATE LAW
Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund
INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 marked an inflection point in the evolution of social norms regarding
sexual misconduct. While victims of workplace sexual harassment and sexual assault had
long suffered in silence, the surfacing of serious sexual misconduct allegations against
Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein in October 2017 encouraged many more victims to
tell their personal stories of abuse. Within two months, a long list of celebrities and public
figures faced allegations of sexual misconduct, including actors Ben Affleck, Dustin
Hoffman, and Kevin Spacey, broadcasters Matt Lauer, Bill O’Reilly, and Charlie Rose,
comedian Louis C.K., journalists Ryan Lizza and Mark Halperin, singer Nick Carter, radio
personalities Garrison Keillor and Tavis Smiley, and politicians such as Congressman John
Conyers, Senator Al Franken, and failed senatorial candidate Roy Moore.1 What began as the
“#MeToo moment” quickly grew into a #MeToo movement that shows no signs of losing
steam.2
It did not take long for sexual harassment allegations to reach corporate boardrooms.
Even before the Weinstein allegations emerged, a number of high-profile chief executives
had resigned in recent years amid allegations of sexual harassment, including Mark Hurd of
Hewlett Packard,3 Dov Charney of American Apparel,4 Roger Ailes of Fox News,5 Mark
Light of Signet Jewelers,6 Kris Duggan of the enterprise software company BetterWorks,7
and Mike Cagney of the online lender SoFi.8 And since Weinstein’s departure from his film
See Samantha Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual
Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, Time (Dec. 20, 2017), http://time.com/5015204/harveyweinstein-scandal.
2 See Monica Akhtar, #MeToo: A movement or a moment?, The Washington Post (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/11/09/metoo-a-movement-or-amoment/?utm_term=.c6edec5a9c44.
3 Ben Worthen & Pui-Wing Tom, H-P Chief Quits in Scandal, Wall St. J. (Aug. 7, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703309704575413663370670900
4 See Shane Farro, American Apparel Lawsuit Is ‘Mother Of All Sexual Harassment Cases,’ Judge
Says, Huffington Post (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/american-apparellawsuit-dov-charney-sexual-harassment_us_5617c6dce4b0082030a2067d.
5 Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, More Trouble at Fox News: Ailes Faces New Sexual Claims and
O’Reilly
Loses
Two
Advertisers,
N.Y.
Times
(April
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/.../fox-news-roger-ailes-harassment-suit.html.
6 See Drew Harwell, Signet Jewelers CEO, at Center of Gender-Discrimination Case, Retires for
‘Health
Reasons’,
Wash.
Post
(July
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/07/17/signet-jewelers-ceo-mark-lightat-the-center-of-a-sprawling-gender-discrimination-case-out-for-health-reasons.
7 See Lizette Chapman, BetterWorks CEO Resigns Amid Sexual Harassment Lawsuit, Bloomberg
Tech. (July 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-26/betterworks-ceoduggan-resigns-amid-sexual-harassment-lawsuit.
8 See Katie Benner & Nathaniel Popper, Chief Executive of Social Finance, an Online Lending StartUp,
to
Step
Down,
N.Y.
Times
(Sept.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/technology/sofi-mike-cagney-sexual-harassment.html. In
1
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production firm, the cascade of CEO resignations and leaves of absence related to sexual
misconduct has continued.9 Meanwhile, several high-profile executives below the CEO level
at firms such as Amazon Studios,10 Fidelity Investments,11 Morgan Stanley,12 NPR,13 and
Walt Disney Company14 have left their jobs after sexual harassment allegations against them
surfaced.
These scandals have caught the attention of shareholders and plaintiffs’ lawyers. And in
2017 and the first quarter of 2018, shareholders at four publicly traded firms—Signet
Jewelers, Twenty-First Century Fox, Liberty Tax, and Wynn Resorts—filed lawsuits against
corporate directors and officers on grounds related to reported sexual misconduct at those
companies. First, in March and April 2017, shareholders at Signet Jewelers filed a series of
class action lawsuits alleging that the company, its CEO, and other current and former
officers violated federal securities law by misleading investors about a culture of sexual
harassment at the firm.15 Those claims have since been consolidated in the federal district
court for the Southern District of New York, and a motion to dismiss the consolidated class

addition, Uber founder Travis Kalanick resigned as CEO of the ride-sharing app maker amid
allegations that he tolerated a toxic work environment and widespread sexual harassment at the firm.
See Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. Times (June 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html.
9 See, e.g., Marco della Cava, Hyperloop Cofounder Pishevar Takes Leave After Harassment
Allegations,
USA
Today
(Dec.
5,
2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/12/05/hyperloop-cofounder-pishevar-takes-leavesafter-harassment-allegations/923730001; Fenway Health CEO Quits Over Sexual Harassment
Claims
Against
Doctor,
Modern
Healthcare
(Dec.
11,
2017),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20171211/NEWS/171219983.
10 See John Koblin, Roy Price Quits Amazon Studios After Sexual Harassment Claim, N.Y. Times
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/media/roy-price-amazonstudios.html; Olivia Zaleski, Two Executives Depart Amazon’s Audible Unit After Harassment
Probe, Seattle Times (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/twoexecutives-depart-amazons-audible-unit-after-harassment-probe.
11 Kirsten Grind, Sarah Krouse & Jim Oberman, Star Fidelity Manager Gavin Baker Fired Over
Sexual Harassment Allegations, Wall St. J. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/starfidelity-manager-gavin-baker-fired-over-sexual-harassment-allegations-1507841061.
12 See Margas Eltagouri, Former Congressman Harold Ford Jr. Fired by Morgan Stanley Over
Inappropriate
Behavior,
Company
Says,
Wash.
Post
(Dec.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/12/07/former-congressman-haroldford-jr-fired-by-morgan-stanley-over-inappropriate-behavior-company-says.
13
See David Folkenflik, NPR’s Sexual Harassment Scandal, NPR (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/05/562188679/nprs-sexual-harassment-scandal
14 See Brooks Barnes, John Lasseter, a Pixar Founder, Takes Leave After ‘Missteps,’ N.Y. Times
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/business/media/john-lasseter-pixardisney-leave.html.
15 For the most recent complaint in the case, see Fourth Amended Class Action Compl., In re Signet
Jewelers Limited Securities Litigation, Docket No. 1:16-cv-06728 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Signet Complaint]. For earlier pleadings, see Second Amended Class Action Compl.,
Dube v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., No. 1:16-cv-06728 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 3, 2017); Mikolchak v. Signet
Jewelers Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-02846 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 31, 2017); Irving Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Sys.
v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-02845 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 28, 2017).
2
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action complaint is now fully briefed and pending decision.16 Second, after the departures of
CEO Roger Ailes and broadcaster Bill O’Reilly from Fox News, shareholders filed a
derivative action against the late Ailes’s estate and against directors of parent company
Twenty-First Century Fox alleging that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties by
allowing sexual harassment to run rampant at the network.17 That suit settled on the same
day it was filed in November 2017, for $90 million plus an agreement by the network to
establish a panel of advisors tasked with improving the work environment at Fox News.18
Third, a Philadelphia-based pension fund filed a derivative lawsuit against Liberty Tax and its
former CEO, John Hewitt, in December 2017 after news reports revealed that Hewitt had
carried on sexual relationships with several female employees and diverted company
resources to his romantic liaisons.19 Fourth and most recently, three pension funds filed
derivative actions against Wynn Resorts in Nevada court alleging breaches of fiduciary duty
by the company’s directors and officers after a Wall Street Journal report in January 2018
revealed a decades-long pattern of sexual harassment by CEO Steve Wynn.20
These four cases do not mark the first time that publicly traded corporations and their
directors and officers have faced shareholder lawsuits arising out of workplace sexual
misconduct. Sex scandals at the pharmaceutical company ICN (now Valeant), the tech giant
Hewlett-Packard, the clothing brand American Apparel, and the executive search firm
CTPartners all have led to shareholder suits in the past. However, the #MeToo movement
will likely lead to many more such claims, raising important doctrinal questions for scholars
See Order, In re Signet Jewelers Limited Securities Litigation, Docket No. 1:16-cv-06728 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 7, 2018).
17 See Derivative Compl., City of Monroe Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Murdoch, Docket No. 2017-0833
(Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Murdoch Complaint].
18 See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, and Release 26-28, City of Monroe
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Murdoch, Docket No. 2017-0833-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017). After
Roger Ailes left Fox News, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York also
opened an investigation into whether the network’s parent company, Twenty-First Century Fox, had
violated federal securities law by misreporting settlement payments that it made to Ailes’s accusers.
See Joe Flint & Michael Rothfield, Scope of Federal Probe into Fox News Broadens, Wall St. J. (May
4,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/scope-of-federal-probe-into-fox-news-broadens1493938947. No charges have been filed publicly in the several months since news of the
investigation emerged.
19 See Verified Stockholder Derivative Compl., Asbestos Workers’ Philadelphia Pension Fund v.
Hewitt, No. 2017-0883 (Del. Ch. filed Dec. 11, 2017), http://bit.ly/2F9G2QS [hereinafter Hewitt
Complaint]; Kimberly Pierceall, Ex-CEO of Liberty Tax Likely Had Sex in His Office and Dated
Employees, Report Says, Virginian-Pilot (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://pilotonline.com/business/consumer/article_90141e98-cf88-56a8-afcd-e1170fef68c6.html.
20 Verified Stockholder Derivative Compl., Norfolk Cnty Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. A-18-769062-B
(Nev. Dist. Ct., Clark Cnty., Feb. 6, 2018), http://bit.ly/2EUYYzl [hereinafter Wynn Complaint];
Register of Actions, Operating Engineers Construction Industry & Miscellaneous Pension Fund v.
Wynn, No. A-18-769630-B (Nev. Dist. Ct., Clark Cnty., Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=11844440; Verified
Stockholder Derivative Complaint, DiNapoli v. Wynn, No. __ (Nev. Dist. Ct., Clark Cnty. filed Feb.
22, 2018), http://osc.state.ny.us/press/docs/wynn-complaint.pdf; see Alexandra Berzon et al.,
Dozens of People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, Wall St.
J. (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-people-recount-pattern-of-sexualmisconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953.
16
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and practitioners of corporate and securities law that the existing academic literature has yet
to address. First, under what conditions will directors and officers be held liable to
shareholders under state corporate law for perpetrating sexual misconduct or allowing it to
occur at their firms? And second, under what conditions do federal securities laws require
publicly traded companies to disclose the fact that top executives have been accused of
sexual misconduct or that corporate funds have been used to settle harassment claims?
While we can glean some insights from the outcomes of past cases, these questions remain
fundamentally unresolved.
For scholars and activists focused on fighting sexual misconduct, the specter of fiduciary
and securities fraud liability in cases of workplace sexual misconduct also raises questions
with strategic and normative dimensions. Is it wise to utilize corporate and securities law as
tools to address sexual harassment, or would the #MeToo movement be better advised to
focus its energy on alternative legal and political mechanisms? On one view, any
development that leads corporate directors and officers to devote more attention to sexual
misconduct at their firms should be welcomed. At the same time, the use of corporate and
securities law to regulate workplace-based sexual misconduct has potential discursive and
distributional implications that require careful consideration before these tools are widely
deployed. And looming are legitimate concerns about the potential for liability to backfire in
ways that ultimately work to the disadvantage of the (primarily female) employees who are
most likely to be the victims of harassment.
Our observations regarding the legal merits as well as the strategic and normative
implications of these types of lawsuits are necessarily tentative. Our primary aim in this
Article is to advance a conversation among scholars, practitioners, and activists regarding the
legal duties of corporate fiduciaries to prevent, respond to, and disclose the occurrence of
workplace-based sexual misconduct. To facilitate this conversation, we provide the first
detailed analysis of how claims by shareholders against corporate fiduciaries who have
committed, tolerated, or concealed sexual misconduct at their firms might fit within existing
legal frameworks. We also analyze the benefits and costs of using corporate and securities
law as tools in the fight against workplace-based sexual misconduct. While the viability and
desirability of shareholder lawsuits in cases of sexual misconduct will become clearer if and
as more such cases arise, the one claim we can make confidently at this point is that
corporate law will—as it always has—continue to reflect evolving social norms.21 The social
transformation sparked by the #MeToo movement will be no exception.
Our Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains how areas of law other than
corporate and securities law—most significantly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—
historically have addressed workplace-based sexual misconduct. We take stock of Title VII’s
successes while also highlighting its shortcomings and identifying the voids that corporate
and securities law potentially can fill.

On the relationship between corporate law and social norms, see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999); and Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1619 (2001).
21
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Part II considers recent reports of sexual harassment from the perspectives of corporate
and securities law. (From now on, we will use the term “corporate law” to refer to state laws
addressing the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers as well as federal laws
regarding the obligations of publicly traded corporations to disclose information to existing
shareholders and potential investors.22) We use the handful of already-filed shareholder
claims arising out of CEO sexual harassment as jumping-off points to analyze the potential
liability of corporations, as well as their directors and officers, after sexual misconduct at a
firm is revealed. We identify various legal arguments available to shareholders who seek hold
directors and officers responsible for corporate sexual misconduct, and we conclude that in
some instances, corporate fiduciaries will be liable to shareholders for committing, enabling,
or failing to prevent workplace-based sexual misconduct at their companies. And while we
do not believe that publicly traded companies have an affirmative duty to disclose sexual
harassment claims in most cases, we specify the circumstances under which companies
might be held liable under federal securities statutes for misleading statements regarding
workplace sexual misconduct. We also outline strategies for board members who seek to
reduce the incidence of sexual harassment at their firms and to contain the fallout when
harassment does occur. And finally, we describe other options available to shareholders who
seek to use their voice within portfolio companies to catalyze lasting organizational change.
In Part III, we step back from the legal questions of whether and when corporations and
their fiduciaries will face liability in connection with workplace-based sexual misconduct, and
ask why corporate law should be invoked in these circumstances. We anticipate and address
several arguments against the use of corporate law as a tool to regulate and remedy sexual
harassment and sexual assault. One such argument is that using corporate law to deter
workplace-based sexual misconduct distracts and detracts from the principal purposes of
these areas of law: to maximize shareholder value,23 protect investors,24 and promote the

We are cognizant that this space-saving construction entangles us in a debate over whether federal
securities law should be considered a species of corporate law. See James J. Park, Reassessing the
Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 116, 118 & nn.2-5 (2017)
(collecting sources); id. at 120 (arguing that “the better way of framing the difference between
securities and corporate law” is to say that “securities law protects the investor while he is a trader,
and corporate law protects the investor while he is an owner”). The definitional debate often has
ideological overtones: as James Park notes, those who argue that “securities law is just a federal
version of corporate law” generally believe that federal regulation of corporate governance “should
be expanded,” while those who argue for a distinction between corporate and securities law generally
want to restrict the scope of federal intervention. See id. at 118. For present purposes, we take no
position in that debate. We clump corporate and securities law together for the entirely nonideological purpose of avoiding awkward and cumbersome sentence constructions in the pages that
follow.
23 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
24 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, What We Do (last accessed Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (“Congress established the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1934 to enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote stability in the markets
and, most importantly, to protect investors.”).
22
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efficient allocation of capital.25 A second objection is nearly the mirror image of the first:
focusing on the ways in which workplace-based sexual misconduct harms shareholders will
divert attention from much more significant harms to victims. A third concern is
distributional: reliance on corporate law in the fight against workplace-based sexual
misconduct will do more to protect potential victims in high-paying professional positions—
who are more likely to interact with the executives of publicly traded companies—than to
protect the millions of manufacturing and service industry workers who face harassment on
a regular basis. A fourth concern focuses on the potential for backlash, and in particular, the
possibility that high-ranking men will respond to the risk of litigation by effectively excluding
female employees from their inner circle.26 We take all of these objections seriously, though
we nonetheless conclude that corporate law still can play a productive role in reducing the
incidence of sexual harassment and sexual assault at and beyond publicly traded companies.
We end by situating the conservation over corporate law and workplace-based sexual
misconduct within the broader context of the debate over corporate governance and social
responsibility. On one view, the use of corporate law to combat workplace-based sexual
misconduct is part and parcel of a broader phenomenon of extending corporate law to reach
the social concerns of the day—ranging from gender diversity in the boardroom27 to
genocide in the Democratic Republic of the Congo28 to global greenhouse gas emissions.29
On another view, corporate law concepts such as “shareholder value” and “materiality”
necessarily reflect changing perceptions among corporate stakeholders and society at large.30
On this latter view, it is not just that corporate law is being deployed to advance the aims of
the #MeToo movement; it is also that the #MeToo movement has revealed (or reinforced
our understanding) that widespread sexual harassment stands as an obstacle to the efficient
allocation of human and financial capital.

See Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in Capital Markets and Financial
Intermediation 81, 81–108 (Colin Mayer and Xavier Vives eds., 1993); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial
Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 188-89, 210–12 (2000).
26 See, e.g., Melinda Newman, Why the #MeToo Movement Could Have Chilling Effect for Women
in
Music
Industry,
Billboard
(Dec.
14,
2017),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8070562/metoo-movement-women-music-industryimpact.
27 See David A. Katz & Laura McIntosh, Gender Diversity on Boards: The Future Is Almost Here,
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (March 25, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/25/gender-diversity-on-boards-the-future-is-almosthere/
28 See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities
Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 327 (2011).
29 See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate
Counsel - It's a Legal Problem, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 89 (2004).
30 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market
Value, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 521/2017 (August 1, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004794.
25
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I.
A.

THE REGULATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT BEFORE #METOO

Defining Terms

The concept of “sexual harassment” first emerged in the legal and lay lexicons relatively
recently, though harassment on the basis of sex in and beyond the workplace is, of course,
not a new phenomenon. As Figure 1 illustrates, the term only came into widespread use
starting in the 1970s, with a sharp upsurge in attention in the 1990s amid high-profile
scandals involving Supreme Court nominee (later Justice) Clarence Thomas and President
Bill Clinton. (Presumably we would see another abrupt uptick if the data extended to 2017.)

Figure 1. Frequency of the Phrase “Sexual Harassment” in Google Books Archive,
1900-2008

The feminist author and activist Lin Farley was one of the first to formulate a definition
of “sexual harassment.” In a 1975 survey distributed to women at Cornell University and to
public employees in Binghamton, New York, Farley defined “sexual harassment” as:
Any repeated and unwanted sexual comments, looks, suggestions, or physical contact
that you find objectionable or offensive and causes you discomfort on your job.31
This definition has evolved since Farley coined the term forty years ago. First, the
consensus today is that objectionable or offensive conduct need not be “repeated” to
constitute sexual harassment.32 Second, courts have said that “sexual harassment” includes
Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job 20 (1978).
See Margaret A. Crouch, The “Social Etymology” of ‘Sexual Harassment’, 29 J. Soc. Phil. 19, 20
(1998).
31
32
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harassment on the basis of sex even when it does not “take the form of sexual advancements
or of other incidents with clearly sexual overtones.”33 What matters is that the harassment is
discriminatory on the basis of sex, not that it is sexual.34 Therefore, a physically aggressive
but not explicitly sexual act by a male supervisor against a female employee may be
actionable under Title VII. In addition, harassment of men by men, and of men by women,
and of women by women also may violate the statute.35 Third, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)36 and one federal court of appeals37 have taken the
position that “sexual harassment” includes harassment on the basis of sexual orientation.
Several other circuits,38 as well as the Trump administration Justice Department,39 have
adopted the opposite view.
Two additional observations about the definition of sexual harassment are worth noting.
First, Farley’s definition of sexual harassment is limited to harassment “on the job.” As
discussed below, the evolution of the concept of sexual harassment in American law has
occurred primarily in the context of employment discrimination law, and so workplace
incidents have been the focus. Second, Farley’s definition of sexual harassment includes
objectionable or offensive physical contact—and thus would encompass sexual assault as
well. Sexual assault can thus be considered an extreme form of sexual harassment rather than
a separate category.40 In the succeeding pages, we will use the phrase “sexual harassment”
with the understanding that some of the incidents described also rise to the level of assault.
Following Farley’s pioneering work, the feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon further
articulated the concept of sexual harassment in her now-classic 1979 book Sexual Harassment
of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination.41 MacKinnon drew a distinction between “quid
pro quo” sexual harassment and sexual harassment as a “persistent condition of work.”42 Quid
pro quo sexual harassment involves, as the name suggests, cases in which “sexual
compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity.”43
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985); accord Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting and following McKinney).
34 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
35 See id. (same-sex harassment); Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The
law is well settled that sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor is not confined to instances
involving male supervisors and female subordinates; it can occur in the female supervisor-male
subordinate context. It can even occur in the same-sex context.”).
36 See Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, Agency No. 2012-24738-FAA-03 (E.E.O.C. July
15, 2015).
37 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
38 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Zarda v.
Altitude Express, __ F.3d __, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4608 (Feb. 26, 2018) (en banc).
39 See Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. Times (July 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html.
40 See Angie Andera, Here’s The Real Difference Between Sexual Harassment & Sexual Assault,
Since
Some
People
Still
Don’t
Get
It,
Women.com
(Oct.
23,
2017),
https://www.women.com/angie/lists/what-is-the-difference-between-sexual-harassment-andassault-assault.
41 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
32 (1979).
42 Id. at 32.
43 Id.
33
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Sexual harassment as a condition of work is “[l]ess clear, and undoubtedly more pervasive”:
it encompasses harassment that “simply makes the work environment unbearable.”44 As
MacKinnon describes:
Unwanted sexual advances, made simply because she has a woman’s body, can be a
daily part of a woman’s work life. She may be constantly felt or pinched, visually
undressed and stared at, surreptitiously kissed, commented upon, manipulated into
being found alone, and generally taken advantage of at work—but never promised or
denied anything explicitly connected with her job.45
What MacKinnon referred to as “condition of work” sexual harassment is today more
commonly known as “hostile work environment” sexual harassment. Her taxonomy of
harassment—and specifically,46 the distinction between “quid pro quo” and “hostile work
environment” sexual harassment—has gained wide acceptance, including by the EEOC and
the Supreme Court. But the road to legal recognition has been long and winding. The
following Section briefly charts that path.
B.

Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination

The primary legal mechanism for regulating and remedying sexual harassment in the
workplace is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That statute provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . .47
According to a persistent myth, the word “sex” was added to Title VII at the last minute
by a congressman from Virginia who opposed civil rights for African-Americans and sought
to scuttle the bill by broadening it to cover gender. In fact, the addition of sex discrimination
to the list of prohibited practices was the result of a concerted lobbying effort by a national
women’s organization with the support of female lawmakers in the House and Senate.48 The
success of this effort did not, however, translate immediately into the legal recognition of
sexual harassment as a proscribed behavior.
Beyond its prohibition on employment discrimination, the 1964 Act also created a new
administrative agency, the EEOC, which was tasked with drafting regulations and enforcing
Id. at 40.
Id.
46 MacKinnon’s view that sexual harassment can occur only “in the context of a relationship of
unequal power” is not as uniformly accepted. Compare id. at 1-2 (“Sexual harassment, most broadly
defined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power.”), with Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol’y J. 333, 335 (1990) (“Incorporating abuse of power into the definition . . .
seems unduly limiting.”).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
48 Rachel Ostermant, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban
on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 409, 412-15 (2009).
44
45
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the civil rights law.49 To bring a claim under Title VII, an employee generally must file a
charge with the EEOC no more than 180 days after the time that the alleged discrimination
occurred.50 (The period for filing a charge is extended to 300 days when a state or local
agency enforces an overlapping employment discrimination law.51) If the EEOC finds in
favor of the employee, it first seeks to settle the charge with the employer,52 and if that fails,
the commission can sue the employer in federal court.53 If the commission decides not to file
a lawsuit, it will issue a “right-to-sue” letter indicating that the employee has 90 days from
receipt of the letter to bring a lawsuit in federal court.54 If the EEOC instead makes a “no
probable cause” determination or dismisses the charge for procedural irregularities, it will
also send the employee a “dismissal and notice of rights” that informs the employee of his or
her right to sue within 90 days.55
From the outset, sex discrimination claims constituted a significant portion of the
EEOC’s case load. In 1966, the first year that records were kept, 33.5% of charges filed with
the EEOC were sex discrimination claims.56 (In 2016, the figure was a slightly lower but still
substantial 29.4%.57) Yet for the first dozen years after the passage of Title VII, neither the
EEOC nor the federal courts recognized sexual harassment as a form of actionable sex
discrimination.
The experience of Adrienne Tomkins is illustrative of attitudes toward sexual harassment
in the early years of Title VII. Tomkins was a secretary at Public Service Electric and Gas
Co. (PSE&G) in Newark, New Jersey, in the early 1970s. In October 1973, her male
supervisor suggested that she should have lunch with him in a restaurant near their office to
discuss a potential promotion. At lunch, according to Tomkins, the supervisor told her that
she should have sex with him if she wanted to continue their working relationship. When
she sought to leave the restaurant, the supervisor physically restrained her and told her that
no one at PSE&G would help her if she complained about the incident. Tomkins did
complain—and was transferred to an inferior position in another department before being
fired in January 1975.58
Tomkins filed a charge with the EEOC, which found no probable cause—thus allowing
her to sue in federal court. The district court dismissed Tomkins’s claim that her supervisor’s
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.13.
51 Id. Note that if there is a continuous pattern of harassment, the statute of limitations period runs
from the last incident. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
52 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24.
53 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.27; 1601.29.
54 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19.
55 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18.
56 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Shaping employment discrimination law (July 30,
2016), www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html.
57
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission,
Charge
Statistics,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.
58 These facts are drawn from the federal district court and appellate opinions in Tomkins’s case. See
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (Tomkins I), 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J. 1976); Tomkins v.
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (Tomkins II), 568 F.2d 1044, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing the
judgment in Tomkins I).
49
50
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conduct was actionable under Title VII (though it allowed her to pursue a claim against
PSE&G for her firing). As the district judge in Tomkins’s case wrote:
The abuse of authority by supervisors of either sex for personal purposes is an
unhappy and recurrent feature of our social experience. . . . It is not, however, sex
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII even when the purpose is sexual. . . .
The attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex phenomenon
and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most personnel
decisions. . . . If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could, prudently,
attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An invitation to
dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious
relationship turned sour at some later time. And if an inebriated approach by a
supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the basis of a
federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later denied to the
subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.59
The attitude toward sexual harassment expressed by the district judge in Tomkins’s case
will likely strike most modern readers as antediluvian. Indeed, even by the time of the district
court decision, the tide was already turning. Five months earlier, a federal district court in
Washington, D.C., held that “retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because a female
employee denied his sexual advances, constitutes sex discrimination within the definitional
parameters of Title VII.”60 The court explained that “the conduct of the plaintiff’s supervisor
created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one gender and not the
other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly situated.”61 The next year, the D.C.
Circuit held in Barnes v. Costle that an employer was liable for sex discrimination under Title
VII when a supervisor fired an employee after she refused his sexual advances.62 And in
1980, the EEOC for the first time issued guidelines that defined sexual harassment as a form
of sex discrimination.63 Significantly, the 1980 guidelines recognized both quid pro quo

Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). For other early cases holding
that sexual harassment did not constitute sex discrimination, see Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390
F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); and Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (C.D Cal. 1976),
rev’d, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
60 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
61 Id. at 657–58.
62 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63 According to the EEOC guidelines:
59

Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Final Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, __ (Nov.
10, 1980), 29 CFR § 16044.11(a).
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sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment as unlawful employment
practices under Title VII.64
C.

Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment

While the EEOC guidelines were quickly embraced by lower federal courts,65 it was not
until 1986 that the Supreme Court explicitly recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII. That decision, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,66 marked a
victory for feminist scholars and activists who had been arguing for years that sexual
harassment is sex discrimination. At the same time, the decision dealt a setback to efforts to
hold employers liable for harassment of their employees.
The plaintiff in that case, Mechelle Vinson, worked as a teller and later an assistant
branch manager at a bank in Washington, D.C. According to Vinson’s account, the bank’s
male branch manager invited her out to dinner relatively early in her four-year career at the
bank and suggested that they have sex at a nearby motel. Vinson said that she initially
refused but later acquiesced out of fear that she would otherwise lose her job. According to
Vinson’s account, the branch manager “thereafter made repeated demands upon her for
sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and after business hours,” and the two had
intercourse 40 or 50 times. Vinson also said that the branch manager “fondled her in front
of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there alone,
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.” She said that she
broke off the relationship when she “started going with a steady boyfriend,” and she was
fired the following year.67 She subsequently sued the bank and the branch manager under
Title VII, lost in district court,68 but prevailed upon the D.C. Circuit to reverse the district
court’s decision.69 Hers was the first sexual harassment claim to reach the Supreme Court
after the EEOC issued its 1980 guidelines.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that hostile work environment sexual harassment
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.70 It added that such conduct is actionable if
the harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”71 And it said that Vinson’s
allegations—“which include not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the
most serious nature—are plainly sufficient to state a claim for ‘hostile environment’ sexual
harassment.”72 The Court also rejected the notion that Vinson’s “voluntary” submission to
intercourse with the branch manager vitiated her sexual harassment claim. “The correct
inquiry,” according to the Court, “is whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the

See id.
See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983).
66 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
67 Id. at 59-61.
68 Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676 (D.D.C. 1980).
69 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
70 477 U.S. at 67.
71 Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id.
64
65
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alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual
intercourse was voluntary.”73
The Justices were sharply divided, however, on the question of when an employer can be
held liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, said that employers should be strictly liable when a
supervisor sexually harasses an employee under his supervision.74 As Justice Marshall argued,
“it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the
wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s
authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.”75
Compelling as that argument may be, it failed to win the day. A five-member majority
concluded instead that employers are not “always automatically liable for sexual harassment
by their supervisors.”76 At the same time, the majority rejected the bank’s argument that an
employer should be immune from liability whenever it has a policy against discrimination
and the victim fails to invoke an available grievance procedure.77
In the dozen years that followed Meritor, federal courts adopted conflicting standards for
determining when an employer should be liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor,78
prompting the Supreme Court to take up the question again in two companion cases decided
in 1998. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme
Court held that employers are automatically liable “[w]hen a plaintiff proves that a tangible
employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands.”79 A
tangible employment action, the Court said, is one that constitutes “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”80 In the
absence of a tangible employment action, employers may assert a two-prong affirmative
defense, which operates as a bar to liability or damages. The Court explained (using identical
language in both decisions):
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages…. The
defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise…. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the

Id. at 68.
Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
75 Id. at 76-77.
76 Id. at 72.
77 Id.
78 Scott B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability
under Title VII, 143 U. Penn. L. Rev. 571 (1994).
79 See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
80 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
73
74

13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action….81
This affirmative defense—now known as the Ellerth/Faragher defense—is tailored to
cases of harassment by supervisors, whereas employers can more easily escape liability when
the harasser is a co-worker. In such cases, employer liability is governed by a negligence
standard, which means that employers would be liable only when they knew or should have
known of the harassment, but failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.82
At the same time as it limited the range of circumstances in which supervisor and coworker harassment would be imputed to an employer, the Court in Faragher preserved an
island of strict liability for a “class of an employer organization’s officials who may be treated
as the organization’s proxy.”83 The Court did not fully define the contours of that class, but
it said that a company’s president was “indisputably” within the category.84 It also
approvingly cited lower court decisions recognizing strict liability when the harasser is an
owner, proprietor, partner, corporate officer,85 or a supervisor “holding a sufficiently high
position ‘in the management hierarchy of the company for his actions to be imputed
automatically to the employer.’”86 Lower courts have applied this last rule—known as the
alter ego doctrine—in cases of high-ranking corporate officials below the officer level.87
Beyond evidence of high rank, the key is to show that the employee exercised “exceptional
authority and control” within the organization.88
In sum, companies can expect to be held strictly liable for harassment by high-ranking
corporate officials with substantial control over corporate affairs. For supervisory
harassment at lower levels, the employer will escape liability if it can successfully invoke the
Faragher/Ellerth defense. And for harassment by employees that lack supervisory authority,
the employer will be liable only if it was negligent in responding to such harassment.
D.

Title VII’s Shortcomings

The Title VII regime has advanced the effort to eradicate sexual harassment from the
workplace, though it falls far short of achieving that end goal. On the one hand, Title VII
Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that lower courts have “uniformly judg[ed] employer liability
for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (2002).
83 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (recognizing that under agency law
principles, corporation is liable for torts committed by employee outside scope of employment
“where the agent’s high rank in the company makes him or her the employer’s alter ego”).
84 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
85 See id. at 790 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)).
86 Id. at 789-90 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1997)).
87 Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2000) (alter ego liability applies
in case of senior vice president of consumer lending who had hiring/firing and supervisory authority
over employees in one department, ultimate authority to disapprove all consumer loans, and who
reported directly to president); Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 53-55 (2d Cir. 2012)
(jury question as to whether alter ego liability applies in case of vice president who “exercised a
significant degree of control over corporate affairs” and whose family held all corporate shares).
88 Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011).
81
82
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provides a path for victims to seek redress, as well as incentives for companies to create
policies and procedures designed to root out and respond to harassment. On the other hand,
the regime has features that limit its effectiveness as a tool for vindicating the rights of
harassed employees. This Section considers some of these limitations.
1. Capped Damages
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed victims of discrimination to recover only injunctive
relief and restitution for economic injuries, such as lost wages.89 Twenty-five years later,
Congress gave courts the power to award both compensatory and punitive damages to
victims of employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.90 The availability
of such damages was not unlimited, however. Proponents of tort reform insisted on
statutory caps on damage awards based on the size of the company.91 The size of these caps
has not been altered since the 1991 Act went into effect, which means that today, the largest
companies—those that have more than 500 employees—cannot be obligated to pay
amounts greater than $300,000 to a victim of sexual harassment, no matter how egregious
the violation.92
These caps have been subject to much criticism. In fact, less than a week after President
Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law, Democratic and Republican Senators
introduced bills to lift the damage caps.93 Critics argue that the caps pose a deterrence
problem, in addition to a compensation problem: employers understand that employees are
unlikely to report harassment, and when employees do report, they will be able to recover
only limited damages. As for the under-compensation concern, the caps are too low to
capture the full vocational, reputational, and emotional harms suffered by victims in the
most severe cases. Nonetheless, efforts to raise the caps since 1991 have proven
unsuccessful.94
2. 180-Day Limitation Period
In addition to capped damages, Title VII provides that victims of sexual harassment
must file charges containing their allegations with the EEOC within 180 days from the date

Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 Yale J. L. &
Feminism 299, 299 (1991).
90 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (1992). Note that these caps do not apply for victims of racial or age
discrimination.
91 See President Bush’s Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 226 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at D-1 (Nov. 21, 1991). The President stated that the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] “adopts a
compromise under which ‘caps’ have been placed on the amount [of compensatory and punitive
damages] that juries may award.” Id.
92 § 1981a(b)(3).
93 On November 26, 1991, Senator Hatch introduced the Employee Equity and Job Preservation Act
of 1991, which would have lifted the cap for all but the smallest employers. 137 Cong. Rec. S18,337.
On that same day Senator Kennedy introduced the Equal Remedies Act of 1991, which would have
done away with all damages caps for victims of discrimination. Id. at S. 18,357.
94 See Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 Coded Sex Discrimination, 25 Yale J.L. & Feminism 249, 250-51 (2014).
89
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of the alleged harm, or 300 days if the victim also files a charge with a state or local agency.95
This period of limitations is shorter than that which governs most civil actions, including
torts and breach of contract,96 and also much shorter than the limitations period for other
anti-discrimination laws.97
For victims of supervisory harassment, the Faragher-Ellerth defense imposes even more
stringent reporting obligations. Under the second prong of the defense, employers must
show that the plaintiff-employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”98 And prompt reporting is a key part of
the reasonableness requirement. For example, one court found a seven-day delay
unreasonable, while others have found delays as short as two months to be unreasonable.99
This truncated reporting period imposes substantial hurdles for victims of harassment,
many of whom may not realize that they have suffered harassment right away. Even when
victims are fully aware of the nature of the harm, victims are often reluctant to file a
complaint. Indeed, as the #MeToo movement has made clear, many victims of sexual
harassment do not go public with their claims for months or even years. There are a few
explanations as to why: harassed employees may fear that their claim will not be believed or
taken seriously,100 may worry about social and professional retaliation,101 and/or may harbor

42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e).
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws & Rules § 201 et seq. (providing that the statute of limitations for
breach of contract is six years); Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 306 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (relying
on the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts).
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (providing a four-year statute of limitations for victims of racial
discrimination). In 1990, Congress tried to expand the limitations period to two years in the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, but the bill was vetoed by the first President Bush. See Donald Livingston, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Twenty-Five Years After, ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law
(Nov.
9,
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2016/11/annual/papers/16b.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
98 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
99 See Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 1998) (finding a seven-day delay unreasonable); Pinkerton v. Colorado Dept. of Trans., 563
F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding a reporting delay of approximately two months unreasonable);
Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a reporting delay of
approximately two months unreasonable); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Svcs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272,
1277, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a reporting delay of approximately two and a half months
unreasonable).
100 Mindy Bergman et al., The (Un)Reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of
Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. Applied Psychology 230 (2002); U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Sexual
Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Trends, Progress, and Continuing Challenges (1995) (finding
that sexual harassment reporting is often followed by organizational indifference or trivialization of
the harassment complaint as well as hostility against the victim).
101 Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following
Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. Occupational Health Psychology 247, 255 (2003)
(finding that 75% if employees who spoke out against workplace sexual assault faced some form of
retaliation).
95
96
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doubts about the confidentiality of internal grievance procedures.102 In addition, the
consequences of an investigation may be unknown or unsatisfactory to employees, further
discouraging reporting.103 Regardless of the reason, the fact remains that victims of
harassment only rarely report harassment. For those who do, the window on a Title VII
claim often will have closed already.104
3. Class Certification
Class action lawsuits have always played an important role in the employment
discrimination context. In many cases, employees cannot afford to file individual cases or
may fear retaliation for doing so. Resolving instances of discrimination on an incident-byincident basis also makes it less likely that employees will come forward because it isolates
individual victims rather than facilitating the sort of collection action that has been the
hallmark feature of “#MeToo.”105 By contrast, the class action vehicle permits employees to
band together, which not only encourages participation but also provides financial incentives
for lawyers to represent them. Moreover, class plaintiffs may be able to seek injunctive or
declaratory relief—relief that may be unavailable in individual cases—which may in turn
serve to transform corporate practices.
Despite the potential benefits of the class action mechanism, recent judicial decisions
have made it much more difficult for employees to bring class action lawsuits alleging
workplace discrimination. The most significant of these cases is the Supreme Court’s 2011
Victims frequently identify the lack of confidentiality as a justification for foregoing an internal
grievance procedure. Edward J. Costello, The Mediation Alternative in Sex Harassment Cases, Arb. J.
16, 16-17 (Mar. 1992) (“[N]o matter how stringent the ‘confidentiality’ requirements are, some coworkers will learn about the complaint as part of their jobs.”).
103 Written Testimony of Mindy E. Bergman, Workplace Harassment: Examining the Scope of the
Problem and Potential Solutions, Meeting of the EEOC Select Task Force on the Study of
Harassment
in
the
Workplace
(June
15,
2015),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/testimony_bergman.cfm.
Psychological
research confirms that victims view reporting sexual harassment as the least desirable response
available to them. One study identifies the most common internally focused responses as endurance
(ignoring the harassment), denial (pretending it is not happening), reattribution (reinterpreting the
situation so it is not defined as harassment), illusory control (blaming oneself), and detachment
(separation from harasser or situation). Common externally focused responses include avoidance of
the harasser or situation, appeasement (putting off the harasser without direct confrontation), and
social support (talking to friends or co-workers about the harassment. The most infrequent response
“is to seek institutional/ organizational relief. Victims apparently turn to such strategies as a last
resort when all other efforts have failed.” Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report
Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J.
Soc. Issues 117, 119 (1995).
104 See Joanna Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment
Law, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1029 (2015).. One study found that gender-harassing conduct was almost never
reported; unwanted physical touching was formally reported only 8% of the time; and sexually
coercive behavior was reported by only 30% of victims who experienced it. EEOC Select Task Force
Study (citing K. A. Lonsway et al., Sexual Harassment in Law Enforcement: Incidence, Impact and
Perception, 16 Police Quarterly 117 (Jun. 2013).
105 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berkeley J. Emp.
& Lab. L. 395, 395 (2011).
102
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decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,106 which involved a class of 1.5 million Wal-Mart
employees who claimed that the company’s pay practices discriminated against women in
violation of Title VII. In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Wal-Mart employees
could not pursue their claims as a class action. According to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
majority, class claims “must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”107
Because the plaintiff-employees allegations involved different sets of facts surrounding their
individual employment decisions, the majority reasoned that it could not say whether
examining the claims would produce a common answer to the discrimination question.
The Dukes decision inspired outrage from commentators who predicted that the ruling
would hinder, or even foreclose, employees’ use of the class action as a tool for redress.108
And in some ways, these concerns have been realized: in the past few years, courts have used
the decision to subject plaintiffs to heightened scrutiny at class certification stage, requiring
them to develop a detailed and nuanced factual record as a prerequisite to certification.109
The Dukes decision does not, however, put the class action mechanism out of reach for
all victims of sexual harassment. Some district courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed as a
class with respect to some common issues—such as whether an employer’s practices create a
hostile work environment for female employees—while deferring damages questions to
individual trials.110 In other cases, employees have been able to surmount the new
certification threshold.111 And even when the class action mechanism is unavailable,
harassment victims may use non-class joinder procedures so that they can litigate their claims
collectively.112
4. Arbitration
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Id. at 350.
108 See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. WalMart, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 34, 37 (2011) (“The Dukes class certification standard jeopardizes
potentially meritorious challenges to systemic discrimination. By redefining the class certification
requirements for employment discrimination cases . . . the Court compromises employees’ access to
justice.”).
109 Katherine Lamm, Work in Progress: Civil Rights Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 50 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 153 (2015).
110 See, e.g., Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 578, 609 (N.D. Iowa 2017); see also Gerald
L. Maatman, Jr., John S. Marrese & Christopher M. Cascino, Court Uses Novel Issue Certification
Device To Sidestep Individualized Issues Otherwise Precluding Class Certification, Workplace Class
Action Blog (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2017/04/court-uses-novelissue-certification-device-to-sidestep-individualized-issues-otherwise-precluding-class-certification.
111 See, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Industries, 716 F.3d 510, 511 (9th Cir. 2013) (certifying a class of
employees bringing wage and hour claims, despite the fact that each class member’s damages were
different, because the evidence suggested that the employer could calculate the information in a
computer database).
112 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) (“Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.”).
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A final obstacle facing employees who seek to sue their employers for sexual
harassment is the frequent presence of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. By 2017,
more than half of nonunion private-sector employees were subject to contractual provisions
that require them to bring workplace-related claims in arbitration proceedings rather than in
court.113 And in 2018, a sharply divided Supreme Court held in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis that
the Federal Arbitration Act requires lower courts to enforce individual arbitration provisions
in employment agreements.114 While the Epic Systems case involved claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Court’s decision applies four square to employment discrimination
claims as well: according to Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, the Epic Systems decision
applies to “any disputes” between employers and employees.115
In practice, the decision in Epic Systems means that employers can require workers—
as a condition of employment—to waive their right to sue and to agree that any
employment-related claims will be pursued in one-on-one arbitration. While some employees
still will prevail in the arbitral forum, their prospects are rather bleak: employee win rates and
damages awards are significantly lower in arbitral proceedings than in federal and state
court.116 And not only do arbitration clauses complicate employees’ ability to vindicate their
rights in court, but these provisions also make it more difficult for others to learn about
employee harassment, as most arbitration proceedings are subject to confidentiality
requirements. While the Supreme Court has held that an arbitration clause in an employment
contract does not affect the EEOC’s right to seek remedies for job discrimination,117 the
spread of arbitration provisions has the potential to substantially reduce the efficacy of
private enforcement of employment discrimination laws.
E.

Beyond Title VII

To summarize so far, Title VII allows victims of sexual harassment to seek injunctive
relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, but such relief is limited by damages
caps and strict limitations periods, as well as the limited availability of the class action
mechanism in federal court. Partly as a result, victims of sexual harassment have turned to
other areas of law—including state human rights and tort law—as potential avenues for
redress.
Several jurisdictions—including California, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New
York City, and West Virginia118—have enacted human rights laws that allow for uncapped
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of sexual harassment and other forms of
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Economic Policy Inst., The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration 1–2
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf.
114 584 U.S. __ (2018) (slip op.).
115 Id. at __ (slip op. at 2).
116 Katherine V.W. Stone and Alexander J.S. Colvin, Economic Policy Inst., The Arbitration
Epidemic 20 tbl.1 (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.
117 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2001).
118 See Barry A. Herstein, 50 Ways From Sunday—Can a Corporation Have a Successful Nationwide
Policy That Is Consistent With State and Local Laws?: Survey of State EEO and Related Laws,
Including Significant Developments and Jury Verdicts 14, 31, 88, 144 (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, 2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/eeocomm/mw/Papers/2009/data/papers/19.pdf.
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employment discrimination. Many state and local human rights statutes also allow for more
generous limitations periods than federal law does. New York, for example, does not require
employees to file a claim with the state human rights agency before bringing a lawsuit,119 and
the statute of limitations under the New York state and city human rights laws is three years
from the date of harassment.120 Thus, anchor Gretchen Carlson could (and did121) sue Roger
Ailes for violating the New York City Human Rights Law without first filing a claim with an
administrative agency, ultimately obtaining a settlement from Fox News for $20 million that
far exceeded what would have been available under Title VII.122
Sexual harassment victims also have scored some victories in tort law actions against
perpetrators—specifically on claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.123 However, assault and battery claims require either reasonable
apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive conduct (assault) or actual contact (battery),
thus providing no remedy in cases where harassment takes a non-physical form. Moreover,
emotional distress claims tend to succeed only in the most egregious circumstances;124 as one
practitioner notes, “[m]ost courts recognize that ordinary employment suits involving sexual
discrimination will not establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”125 Even when tort law claims against perpetrators of sexual harassment succeed,
courts often will hold that the perpetrator’s “purely personal” motives place his actions
outside the scope of employment, thus preventing the plaintiff from holding the employer
liable on a respondeat superior theory.126

See id. at 97.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214; see Eric M. Baum, Statute of Limitations for Sexual Harassment
Claims, Eisenberg & Baum, LLP (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.eandblaw.com/employmentdiscrimination-blog/2016/04/07/statute-limitations-sexual-harassment-claims.
121 See Compl. at 7, Carlson v. Ailes, No. __ (N.J. Sup. Ct. filed July 6, 2016),
https://www.smithmullin.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Carlson-Complaint.pdf.
122 See Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles With Gretchen Carlson Over Roger Ailes
Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlsonsexual-harassment-lawsuit-settlement.html.
123 See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997) (battery). When
harassment takes the form of assault or battery, victims also may be able to seek redress under
criminal law. But despite decades of reform, the criminal justice system often fails victims of sexual
assault. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1305-06 (2011) (“The simple fact is
that rape reforms over the last thirty years have not had the effect feminists desired.”); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law 17 (1998) (“The
legislative changes inspired by the feminist antirape movement accomplished very little.”).
124 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 611, 613-14 (5th Cir.
1999) (sufficient evidence to support verdict against supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional
distress where employee testified that supervisor “harassed her with constant sexual remarks, invited
her to his house for a ‘hot body oil massage,’ told her to undress so he could lick her from head to
toe, asked her to leave her husband and have his child, followed her after work, asked her to go to
Las Vegas with him, and sometimes came up behind her and licked or kissed her face or neck”).
125 Stephanie D. Gironda, Employment Torts 2-3 (ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law—
2009 Labor and Employment Law CLE Conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 2009).
126 See, e.g., Skidmore, 188 F.3d at 614-15, 617 (no employer liability); Cornwall v. Nat’l Westminster
Bank, 1996 NYLJ LEXIS 2505, *24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) (“Where, as here, a tort is
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Notably, none of these regimes—Title VII,127 state human rights law, or tort law—
provides a remedy to the shareholders who are (at least arguably) indirect victims of sexual
harassment in the corporate setting. And yet persistent harassment at a firm may impair
profitability in a number of ways. Most obviously, expenses associated with litigation—
including legal fees, settlements, and judgments—damage a company’s bottom line. Second,
negative publicity associated with sexual harassment scandals may cause harm to a
company’s reputation. Third, sexual harassment potentially interferes with a company’s
ability to hire and retain talented employees who are repelled by the hostile work
environment at the firm. Fourth, harassment may impede the productivity of employees who
are its victims, or who try to steer clear of settings where they might be victimized. In a
handful of cases, shareholders have turned toward state corporate law and/or federal
securities law in order to obtain redress for these indirect harms. The next Part discusses
those efforts.
II.

LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT UNDER CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAWS

The first shareholder lawsuit arising out of workplace sexual misconduct came long
before the Harvey Weinstein scandal made “#MeToo” a household hashtag. In November
1998, a shareholder of the pharmaceutical manufacturer ICN filed a derivative action in
Delaware court asserting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against the firm’s CEO and other
directors stemming from the CEO’s harassment of female employees.128 That suit ultimately
failed (for reasons we discuss in this Part), but it was a harbinger of things to come. Since the
ICN suit, at least seven more companies—American Apparel, Hewlett-Packard, CTPartners,
Signet Jewelers, Twenty-First Century Fox, Liberty Tax, and Wynn Resorts—have faced
shareholder lawsuits linked to sexual harassment by top executives. We expect this list to
grow in the coming months and years. In this Part, we rely on the facts of these suits to
develop a general framework for evaluating future claims under state corporate law and
federal securities statutes arising out of workplace sexual misconduct.
A. Canaries in the Coal Mine?
1. ICN
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International made headlines—and enemies—on September
2015 when the firm raised the per-tablet price of a drug that treats a parasitic infection from
$13.50 to $750 overnight.129 But this was not the first time that the company became
enmeshed in controversy. In July 1998, when Valeant still went by the name ICN
committed by an employee for purely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the
employer’s business there is no basis for respondeat superior liability.”).
127 See Thompson v. North American Stainless, 562 U.S. 170, 176-77 (2011) (“If any person injured
in the Article III sense by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd consequences would follow. For
example, a shareholder would be able to sue a company for firing a valuable employee for racially
discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a
consequence.”).
128 See White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 359 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001).
129 See Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. Times (Sept. 20,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-priceraises-protests.html.
21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

Pharmaceuticals, the firm was the focus of a U.S. News & World Report cover story that
detailed allegations of sexual harassment against then-CEO Milan Panic.130 Six women told
U.S. News of repeated incidents in which Panic propositioned them, groped them, or forcibly
kissed them.131 Board members said that they knew nothing about Panic’s behavior for years.
Even after they did learn, they kept him on at the company and continued to compensate
him handsomely.132
The U.S. News story prompted an ICN shareholder, Andrew White, to file a derivative
action against the company, Panic, and 14 other board members.133 According to White’s
complaint, ICN board members made a concerted effort to cover up Panic’s misconduct by
requiring employees to submit grievances to confidential arbitration.134 The company
guaranteed a $3.5 million loan to Panic so that he could pay a settlement in a paternity suit,
and the only collateral that Panic posted for the loan were out-of-the-money stock
options.135 The complaint also suggested that the board had made additional payments to
settle harassment claims against Panic, though the complaint lacked any further details
regarding the amount or nature of these settlements.136
The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed White’s complaint on the grounds that White
had not made out a case for “demand excusal.” We discuss the criteria for demand excusal at
greater detail below, but for now, the key point is that the court considered the board to be
capable of deciding whether to sue Panic on the corporation’s behalf.137 The Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed, noting the “sparse” nature of the allegations against the board.138
But despite that outcome, the shareholder suit served as a warning that corporate directors
and officers could face fiduciary duty liability for engaging in or abetting workplace-based
sexual misconduct.
2. Hewlett-Packard
In the years following White v. Panic, several corporate boards took action against CEOs
accused of sexual harassment or other questionable sexual conduct. Boeing’s board asked
CEO Harry Stonecipher to step down in 2005 after learning that Stonecipher had carried on
an affair with a subordinate.139 Sara Lee Corp.’s CEO, Steven McMillan, resigned that same
year amid allegations that he offered a woman a job at the company on the condition that

Miriam Horn, Sex and the CEO, U.S. News & World Report, July 6, 1998, at 32.
Id.
132 Id.
133 White, 793 A.2d at 359.
134 Id. at 363.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 368-69.
137 See id. at 367-71.
138 783 A.2d at 552.
139 Renae Merle, Boeing CEO Resigns Over Affair With Subordinate, Wash. Post (Mar. 8, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/03/08/boeing-ceo-resigns-over-affairwith-subordinate/199b6a6b-9883-457d-991b-ea23840b1fe2/?utm_term=.557d44915d21.
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she have sex with him.140 The board of the hotel chain Starwood ousted its CEO in 2007
after he sent sexually suggestive e-mails and text messages to a female employee.141 The
board of Hewlett-Packard fired CEO Mark Hurd in 2010, reportedly because board
members believed that Hurd had lied to them about an affair with a former H-P
contractor.142 The CEO of the medical device manufacturer Stryker, Stephen MacMillan (not
to be confused with the Sara Lee chief of a similar name), was reportedly “forced out partly
because certain board members became bothered by his handling of a relationship” with a
former female employee.143 The insurance company Highmark fired CEO Kenneth Melani
in April 2012 after he got into a fight with the husband of a female employee with whom
Melani had carried on an affair.144 That same month, Best Buy forced out CEO Brian Dunn
because of what an audit committee report later described as “an extremely close personal
relationship with a female employee that negatively impacted the work environment.”145
The Best Buy incident demonstrated that the fallout from a CEO’s workplace
misconduct could extend to board members as well. Following Dunn’s departure as CEO,
the chairman of the company’s board, Richard Schulze, resigned when an internal
investigation revealed that he knew about Dunn’s relationship with the female employee but
did not report it to the rest of the board.146 Schulze did, however, return to the company the
following year as “chairman emeritus,”147 raising questions as to whether board members
who abet sexual misconduct by corporate executives would in fact bear significant costs.
Most of the CEO departures listed above did not result in shareholder lawsuits. At least
one, however, did: in 2012, a pension fund for cement and concrete workers filed a class
action complaint in the federal district court for the Northern District of California against
Hewlett-Packard and Hurd for violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934148 (and specifically, the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, which applies to untrue statements of
Susan Chandler, CEO Indiscretions No Longer Overlooked by Boards, Chi. Tribune (Mar. 8,
2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-03-08/business/0503080224_1_harry-stonecipherfemale-boeing-executive-philip-condit.
141 Marcus Baram, Misconduct in the Corner Office, ABC News (Apr. 11, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=3027563&page=1.
142 Robert A. Guth, Ben Worthen & Justin Scheck, Accuser Said Hurd Leaked an H-P Deal, Wall St.
J. (Nov. 6, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703805704575594343622319312.
143 Joann S. Lublin & Christopher Weaver, CEO Sought Nod for Romance, Wall St. J. (May 23,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304791704577420681311173856.
144 Paula Reed Ward, Former Highmark CEO Sues for $32 Million Over Firing, Pittsburgh PostGazette (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/healthcarebusiness/2015/09/03/Former-Highmark-CEO-sues-insurer-for-32-million/stories/201509030183.
145 Erin Carlyle, Best Buy CEO Brian Dunn Gets $6.6 Million Severance Package After “Friendship”
With 29-Year-Old Employee, Forbes.com (May 14, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/05/14/best-buy-ceo-brian-dunn-gets-6-6-millionseverance-package-after-friendship-with-29-year-old-employee/#11bca5615924.
146 Stephanie Clifford, Chairman of Best Buy Resigns After an Internal Audit, N.Y. Times (May 14,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/business/chairman-of-best-buy-to-step-down.html.
147 Schulze Returns to Best Buy as Chairman Emeritus, Omaha World-Herald (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.omaha.com/money/schulze-returns-to-best-buy-as-chairmanemeritus/article_c6cfaeee-4317-517f-86ea-f03b9139ad0e.html.
148 15 U.S.C. § 78i.
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material fact and material omissions149). The complaint alleged that Hewlett-Packard’s
“Standards of Business Conduct”—which emphasized, among other elements, that the
company “refus[ed] to tolerate harassment”—was itself materially misleading, and that the
company’s failure to disclose Hurd’s misconduct constituted a material omission.150
The district court dismissed the shareholders’ complaint,151 and a Ninth Circuit panel
unanimously affirmed.152 In the panel’s view, Hewlett-Packard’s business conduct policy was
“transparently aspirational” and “did not reasonably suggest that there would be no
violations of the [policy] by the CEO or anyone else.”153 The Ninth Circuit also noted in a
footnote that it was “somewhat perplexed” by the shareholders’ theory of the case.
According to the court:
It appears that HP’s ethics and compliance policies worked. Hurd did not live up to
HP’s standards; HP became aware of Hurd’s ostensible misconduct; HP quickly
launched an investigation, confirming the misconduct; and Hurd resigned.154
Not only did Hewlett-Packard avoid liability, but Hurd escaped from the episode largely
unscathed. Hurd left Hewlett-Packard with a $40 million severance package155 and now
makes roughly that amount each year as CEO of Oracle.156 If Hurd’s ouster suggested that
the heads of publicly traded companies would face serious reputational consequences for
inappropriate sexual behavior, the long-term outcome sent precisely the opposite message.
3. American Apparel
Even as other prominent executives lost their jobs over sexual harassment, American
Apparel’s Dov Charney, who founded the clothing company in 1989, managed to hold onto
his CEO title notwithstanding a well-publicized record of sexual harassment allegations. In
2004, Charney reportedly masturbated in front of a reporter for Jane magazine who was
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b).
Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d
1268, 1273-75 (9th Cir. 2017).
151 Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 52 F. Supp.
3d 961 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
152 845 F.3d at 1278-79.
153 Id. at 1278.
154 Id. at 1277 n.3.
155 See Julie Bort, A Rare Glimpse Inside The Life And Mind Of Oracle CEO Mark Hurd, Business
Insider (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-mind-of-oracle-ceo-mark-hurd2015-1. Hurd’s generous severance package itself became the subject of a shareholder suit; two years
after Hurd’s termination, a group of shareholders sued the board, alleging that the voluntary decision
to award Hurd a severance package constituted corporate waste. See Zucker v. Andreessen, 2012 WL
2366448 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2012). Even though Hurd’s employment contract did not entitle him to
any severance payment upon termination, the Court of Chancery concluded that the plaintiffs had
not met the high bar for pleading waste because Hurd provided some consideration for the severance
payment, including a commitment to participate in succession planning.
156 See Adam Lashinsky, The Redemption of Oracle’s Mark Hurd, Fortune (June 8, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/08/redemption-of-mark-hurd-oracle; Gabrielle Solomon, 10 Top-Paid
CEOs, CNN Money (May 31, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/gallery/news/companies/2017/05/31/top-paid-ceos/6.html.
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writing a profile of him.157 In 2005, three former female employees sued him for sexual
harassment,158 with another female employee filing a complaint with the EEOC against
Charney the following year.159 In 2010, the EEOC found the company liable for
discriminating against women “as a class” by “subjecting them to sexual harassment.”160 Five
more female employees filed harassment lawsuits against Charney the following year.161 All
the while, American Apparel’s board left Charney in charge.
In 2010, shareholders of American Apparel filed a derivative action against the company,
Charney, the company’s chief financial officer, and several current and former directors
alleging (among other claims) breaches of fiduciary duties related to sexual harassment at the
company.162 A federal district court in the Central District of California dismissed the
complaint, relying heavily on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Panic. The
court acknowledged that “[t]he complaint here is more specific than the pleading in White,”
and that “the reports documenting Charney’s sexual proclivities and the company’s
unconventional work environment support an inference that the directors knew or should
have known that there was possible cause for concern.”163 The court further noted that the
EEOC’s finding of sexual harassment at the company “lends some credibility to plaintiffs’
claims.”164 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the “plaintiffs have not pled particularized
facts indicating that the board failed to act despite actual or constructive knowledge of
problems with the company’s work environment.”165 As in White v. Panic, the plaintiffs’
failure to disqualify the directors meant that the decision whether to sue Charney was left to
the board.
Charney’s remarkable run at American Apparel finally ended in June 2014, when the
board ousted him as CEO after an internal investigation revealed that he had—among other
infractions—allowed an employee to post naked photos on the Internet of a former
American Apparel employee who had sued Charney for sexual harassment.166 One month
later, two American Apparel shareholders filed fresh derivative actions against the company,
Charney, and former and current directors,167 but these claims were also unsuccessful.
According to the district court, the cascade of sexual harassment claims against Charney
Jamie Wolf, And You Thought Abercrombie & Fitch Was Pushing It?, N.Y. Times Mag. (Apr. 23,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/and-you-thought-abercrombie-fitch-waspushing-it.html.
158 Id.
159 Laura M. Holson, He’s Only Just Begun to Fight, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/fashion/14CHARNEY.html.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 In re Am. Apparel S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV 10-06576 MMM (RCx), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146970 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012).
163 Id. at *99-100.
164 Id. at *102.
165 Id. at *100.
166 Elizabeth A. Harris, American Apparel Ousts Its Founder, Dov Charney, Over Nude Photos,
N.Y. Times (June 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/business/in-firing-dovcharney-american-apparel-cites-posting-of-naked-pictures.html.
167 In re Am. Apparel, Inc., No. CV-14-05230-MWF (JEMx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191466, at *2425 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), aff’d, 696 Fed. Appx. 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
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abated after 2011 and so “the Board may reasonably have believed that Charney’s alleged
sexual proclivities were no longer a significant issue for the Company.”168 Once the new
allegations regarding the posting of naked photos emerged, the directors “did take action for
precisely the reasons Plaintiffs assert they should have.”169
The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the district court’s decision, this time without a
published decision.170 American Apparel, meanwhile, continued to suffer reputationally and
financially. The company has twice filed for bankruptcy since Charney’s departure.171
4. CTPartners
At around the same time as American Apparel tumbled toward bankruptcy, the
executive search firm CTPartners saw a sexual harassment scandal spell its ultimate demise.
In December 2014, the New York Post accused CTPartners of being “a den of discrimination
where women are stripped of profitable accounts, held to a higher standard than their male
colleagues and subjected to lewd behavior.”172 According to the Post article, which cited a
confidential EEOC complaint, one male partner in the firm’s hedge fund practice “called
himself ‘daddy’” and told a female employee that “he wanted to spank her.” When the
female employee complained to the vice chairman, the vice chairman allegedly “dismissed
the matter due to a ‘language barrier,’ even though [the hedge fund partner]’s first language is
English.”173 The Post article also said that the company’s chairman and CEO “ripped off his
clothes . . . during a drunken party at his Florida home” in front of other employees of the
firm in 2012 and that employees had lodged at least a dozen separate sexual harassment
complaints the same year.174
On the day that the Post published its report, CTPartners’ stock price dropped nearly 25
percent.175 The following year, two shareholders filed class action complaints alleging that the
company had violated federal securities laws in connection with the sexual harassment
scandal.176 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the company’s statements about its culture
of honest and ethical conduct and its commitment to diversity and inclusiveness were
inaccurate, that its statements trumpeting its low voluntary turnover rate among employees
Id. at *60.
Id. at *52.
170 696 Fed. Appx. 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
171 Nathan Boomey, American Apparel Topples Into Bankruptcy Again, USA Today (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/11/14/american-apparel-chapter-11bankruptcy/93788450.
172 Kevin Dugan, Wall Street Recruiters Had Boozy Naked Romps: Complaint, N.Y. Post (Dec. 8,
2014), https://nypost.com/2014/12/08/complaint-claims-executives-held-boozy-naked-boys-clubromps.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Lawrence Delevingne, Headhunter Stock Drops 24% on Sex Bias Complaint, CNBC (Dec. 10,
2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/10/headhunter-ctpartners-stock-drops-24-on-sex-biascomplaint.html.
176 See Compl., Zinno v. CTPartners Exec. Search Inc., No. 15-1476 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 25, 2015);
Amended Compl., Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search Inc., No. 15-1476 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 15,
2015).
168
169

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

were misleading, and that the company’s failure to disclose the “true nature” of its work
environment ran afoul of its affirmative disclosure obligations.177
In March 2016, a federal district court in the Southern District of New York granted
CTPartners’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. According to the court, the
company’s statements regarding its corporate culture amounted to “immaterial puffery,” and
its statements regarding its low turnover rate were neither false nor misleading. The court
also concluded that the company had no affirmative duty to disclose sexual harassment
claims under federal securities laws.178 But even though it escaped liability, the consequences
for CTPartners were devastating: just over six months after the Post article, the firm filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.179A Chicago-based rival purchased some of the
company’s assets, but the company’s shareholders emerged empty-handed.180
5. Signet Jewelers
Before 2017, Signet Jewelers was best known for its various diamond jewelry retail
brands—Jared, Kay, Sterling, and Zales—which dotted malls across the world. In February
2017, however, the company captured headlines for less resplendent reasons: the
company—according to a Washington Post exposé based on arbitration documents obtained
by the newspaper—had developed “a corporate culture that fostered rampant sexual
harassment and discrimination.”181 The documents included declarations from approximately
250 employees who said that women at the company “were routinely groped, demeaned and
urged to sexually cater to their bosses to stay employed.”182 The Post further reported
allegations that “top male managers . . . dispatched scouting parties to stores to find female
employees they wanted to sleep with, laughed about women’s bodies in the workplace, and
pushed female subordinates into sex by pledging better jobs, higher pay or protection from
punishment.”183 The list of executives who participated in the practice included the
company’s CEO Mark Light.184
Sexual harassment claims against Signet had been pending for nearly a decade by the
time that the Post story broke, but because these claims were pursued through a confidential
arbitration process, shareholders did not know about the nature or the extent of the
Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 26-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id.
179 Press Release, CTPartners Exec. Search. Inc., CTPartners Executive Search (CTP) Announces
Notice of Default Receipts from JPMogan, Phoenix Life Insurance (June 26, 2015),
http://bit.ly/2EYzm7b.
180 See Claire Bushey, DHR International Sweeps Up Parts of Scandal-Plagued Rival, Crain’s Chi.
Bus. (June 23, 2015),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150623/NEWS04/150629945/dhr-internationalsweeps-up-parts-of-scandal-plagued-rival.
181 Drew Harwell, Hundreds Allege Sex Harassment and Discrimination at Kay and Jared Jewelry
Company (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hundreds-allegesex-harassment-discrimination-at-kay-and-jared-jewelry-company/2017/02/27/8dcc9574-f6b7-11e6bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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allegations.185 The Post story changed all of that, and—unsurprisingly—Signet’s share price
plummeted: the stock dropped more than 12 percent in a single day.186 The company
criticized the Post report as “distorted and inaccurate,”187 but that did little to mitigate the
damage. The stock lost nearly 40% of its value over the course of the calendar year.188
Litigation soon ensued. Several groups of shareholders brought lawsuits against the
company under federal securities laws, and those lawsuits have since been transferred to the
Southern District of New York and consolidated into a single class action.189 The first suit—
a class action complaint filed in federal district court at the end of March—seized on
statements made by the company between 2013 and 2016 acknowledging the existence of
employment discrimination claims but denying all allegations.190 The complaint also quoted a
press release announcing Light’s appointment as CEO that trumpeted his “meticulous
approach to operational details,” his “valuable attributes,” and the board’s “confiden[ce] that
Mark is the right person to lead the Company forward.”191 The complaint asserted violations
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act192 as well as Section 20(a),193 which imposes
joint and several liability on controlling persons who aid and abet securities law violations.
The fourth and most recent amended class action complaint in the case fleshes out the
federal securities fraud claims against Signet and its current and former senior executives in
much greater detail. According to the complaint, “a pervasive culture of sexual harassment
existed at Signet,” which the company’s senior executives undoubtedly knew about because
they “actively participated in it.”194 The complaint goes on to allege that this “culture of
sexual harassment” poses an especially severe risk to Signet’s business “because Signet’s key
product—diamond bridal jewelry—was meant for women,” and because “‘trust’ was
essential to its sales model.”195 The consolidated case has not yet been resolved: briefing at
the dismissal stage is scheduled to conclude in March 2018, with a decision expected
sometime this year.196
6. Fox News

Id.
Lauren Thomas, This Jewelry Brand’s Stock Plummets After Sexual Harassment Allegations
Surface, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/28/signet-jewelers-stock-dropsas-sexual-harassment-allegations-surface.html.
187 Press Release, Signet Jewelers Ltd., Sterling Jewelers Statement on Ongoing Arbitration (Feb. 28,
2017), http://www.signetjewelers.com/investors/news-releases/news-release-details/2017/SterlingJewelers-Statement-on-Ongoing-Arbitration/default.aspx.
188 See NYSE: SIG, Google Finance, https://www.google.com/search?q=NYSE:SIG (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017).
189 See Signet Complaint.
190 Class Action Compl. at 6-17, Mikolchak v. Signet Jewelers Limited et al, Docket No. 1:17-cv02846, Doc. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 31, 2017).
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While the Signet shareholder litigation slowly moves forward, one subsequently filed
shareholder lawsuit related to workplace sexual misconduct has already produced a favorable
outcome for plaintiffs. In November 2017, a pension fund for public employees of the City
of Monroe, Michigan, and several other shareholders of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.,
filed a derivate action in Delaware court arising out of a sexual harassment scandal at Fox
News.197 The defendants include the estate of the late Fox News CEO Roger Ailes, TwentyFirst Century Fox’s controlling shareholder Rupert Murdoch, and several members of the
Twenty-First Century Fox board.198 The complaint alleged that Ailes had “sexually harassed
female employees and contributors with impunity for at least a decade” before his July 2016
departure from the company,199 that Murdoch and others at Twenty-First Century Fox
allowed Fox News anchor Bill O’Reilly to harass several female employees,200 and that the
company paid over $55 million to settle claims of sexual harassment and racial
discrimination.201 Beyond the costs incurred in defending and settling sexual harassment
claims, the complaint cited multiple other harms to the company arising out of its failure to
restrain Ailes and O’Reilly, among them: the possibility that U.K. regulators would block a
proposed acquisition of the pay-TV platform Sky;202 a drop in advertising revenue and
ratings; and the “loss of high profile talent,” including anchors Megyn Kelly, Greta Van
Susteren, and Gretchen Carlson, who left the network in the wake of the harassment
scandal.203
Twenty-First Century Fox did not contest the plaintiffs’ claims. Instead, it promptly
entered into a settlement in which it agreed to trigger a $90 million payment from its
insurers, as well as insurers representing Ailes’ estate.204 The settlement also provided for a
payment of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel,205 as well as the establishment of a
“Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council” tasked with strengthening reporting,
bolstering sexual harassment-related training, and helping to recruit and promote the
advancement of women and minorities.206
The Twenty-First Century Fox settlement led one corporate governance expert to
predict that “we’ll see a lot more derivative lawsuits and share price lawsuits over sexual
harassment cases in coming months.”207 We share that expectation, though the failure of the

See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17.
Id. at 1.
199 Id. at 3.
200 Id. at 47-48.
201 Id. at 5.
202 Id. at 49.
203 Id. at 50.
204 Emily Steel, Fox Establishes Workplace Culture Panel After Harassment Scandal, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/media/fox-news-sexualharassment.html.
205 Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, and Release 26-28, City of Monroe
Employees’ Retirement System v. Rupert Murdoch, No. 2017-0833 (Del. Ch. filed Nov. 20, 2017).
206 Non-Monetary Relief, Compromise, and Release 26-28, City of Monroe Employees’ Retirement
System v. Rupert Murdoch, No. 2017-0833 (Del. Ch. filed Nov. 20, 2017).
207 Anousha Sakoui & Christie Smythe, Fox News Creates Workplace Council to Settle Harassment
Suit, Bloomberg (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-20/fox197
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earlier suits against ICN, Hewlett-Packard, and American Apparel also suggests that such
claims face substantial hurdles. What the Twenty-First Century Fox settlement certainly
illustrates is that shareholder lawsuits against corporations and their directors and officers
arising out of workplace sexual misconduct deserve serious attention, and that despite the
failure of earlier actions, are potentially viable under certain circumstances.
7. Liberty Tax
The ink on the Twenty-First Century Fox settlement had barely dried when Liberty Tax
became the next company caught up in a derivative action arising out of CEO sexual
misconduct. In December 2017, a Philadelphia-based pension fund filed a derivative action
against Liberty Tax and its controlling shareholder and former CEO, John Hewitt, alleging
that Hewitt had breached his duty of loyalty to the company in his capacity as officer and
director.208 “Even by the standards of the recent deluge of sexual misconduct revelations, the
situation at Liberty is shocking,” the complaint charged.209 By February 2018, a second CEO
would be ousted from the company as Liberty Tax’s stock price continued to tumble amid
scandal.210
The problems at Liberty Tax started long before 2017, though they only came to light in
the second half of that year. In July, the company’s ethics hotline reportedly received a call
from employees who said they overheard then-CEO Hewitt having sex in his office. This
was not the first complaint against the CEO: the company paid $500,000 to three former
employees in December 2015 to settle a hostile work environment claim apparently arising
out of Hewitt’s noisy sexual activity.211 This time, though, the complaint prompted the
company’s audit committee to hire an outside law firm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, to conduct an investigation of the claim. According to news reports, Skadden’s
probe revealed that Hewitt had engaged in relationships with as many as ten employees and
had used company resources to provide favors to several of his romantic partners. In one
case, Hewitt apparently allowed a female sales associate whom he was dating to buy a Liberty
Tax franchise with no money down and then—when the relationship ended—arranged for
the company to buy back the franchise for nearly double the purchase price, in addition to
paying the woman a total of $220,000 in cash and stock.212 Remarkably, employees continued
to overhear Hewitt having sex in his office even while the Skadden investigation was
ongoing. In September, the board voted to terminate to Hewitt, paid him more than
$800,000 in severance, and began to negotiate to repurchase his controlling stake in the

agrees-to-workplace-council-to-settle-harassment-litigation (quoting Kirk O. Hanson, executive
director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University).
208 Hewitt Complaint.
209 Id. at 1.
210 See Kimberly Pierceall, Liberty Tax Fires CEO Mid-Tax Season, 6 Months After Firing Founder
John Hewitt, Virginian-Pilot (Feb. 19, 2018),
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company.213 On the day that a Virginia newspaper first reported details of Skadden’s
findings, Liberty Tax’s stock price dropped by 17 percent.214
Notwithstanding his firing and the fall in Liberty Tax’s share price, Hewitt was not
prepared to cede control of the company that he founded without a fight. As a result of the
company’s dual-class structure, Hewitt retains the power to choose five of the company’s
nine directors, and he has made himself one of the five.215 His majority control over the
board effectively allows him to choose the company’s CEO, and in February 2018, he
caused the new CEO to be replaced by one of his own hand-picked board members.216
Meanwhile, the Philadelphia-based pension fund’s derivative action against Hewitt
moves forward in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The complaint alleges, among other
things, that Hewitt breached his fiduciary duty to Liberty Tax by “direct[ing] the Company
to expend resources and assets to . . . further his sexual relations with employees and/or
franchisees of the Company at the expense of the Company.”217 While Chancellor Andre
Bouchard declined to order accelerated discovery at a January hearing, he reportedly said at
the hearing that “[t]he complaint clearly, in my view, states a sufficiently colorable claim that
Hewitt breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in conduct that led to his termination,” and
“neither Hewitt nor Liberty argues to the contrary in their papers in any meaningful sense,
nor do I think they could do so.”218
8. Wynn Resorts
The latest publicly traded company to emerge as the subject of a serious sexual
harassment scandal is Wynn Resorts, a developer and operator of high-end hotels and
casinos.219 In late January 2018, the Wall Street Journal published a report corroborated by
“dozens” of sources who described a “decades-long pattern of sexual misconduct” by the
company’s founder and longtime CEO Steve Wynn.220 One massage therapist who worked
at Wynn’s Las Vegas spa told the Journal that Wynn regularly instructed her to touch his
genitals and at one point asked her to perform oral sex. Several other female employees said
that Wynn frequently exposed himself to them. Another said that Wynn grabbed her waist
and told her to kiss him. A former manicurist at a Wynn-owned hotel said that Wynn forced

Id.; see also Letter from John Garel to Bd. of Directors, Liberty Tax, Inc. (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1528930/000117184317006901/exh_991.htm.
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results for Nov. 8, 2017).
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Liberty Board Member Leaves, Virginian-Pilot (Nov. 13, 2017),
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her to have sex with him. The manicurist reportedly complained to the company’s human
resources department and later settled claims against Wynn for $7.5 million.221
News of the allegations against Wynn caused the company’s share price to plunge,
dropping ten percent in one day.222 In response, the Wynn Resorts board formed a special
committee with the purpose of investigating the allegations. Gambling authorities in Macau
and Nevada also opened investigations. Two weeks later, Wynn resigned.223
The same day as Wynn’s resignation, the Norfolk County Retirement System, a
Massachusetts pension plan that owns shares in Wynn Resorts, filed a derivative suit in
Nevada state court against Wynn, the company’s general counsel, and the board of
directors.224 The suit alleges that Wynn’s ex-wife, herself a former board member, told “a
representative of the Board” in 2009 about the settlement with the manicurist,225 and that the
board knew about the settlement and other allegations against Wynn by 2015.226
Nonetheless, board members “failed to act and continued to support and recommend to the
stockholders Mr. Wynn’s continued leadership and compensation,” according to the
complaint.227 The pension-plan plaintiff asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty and
unjust enrichment against Wynn himself, the general counsel, and the nine members of the
board.228
Despite the seriousness of the allegations against Wynn and the board, shareholders face
a particularly high hurdle—unlike ICN, American Apparel, Twenty-First Century Fox, and
Liberty Tax, which are incorporated in Delaware, Wynn Resorts is a Nevada corporation.229
Nevada law is generally considered to be less friendly to shareholder-plaintiffs than Delaware
law.230 In Nevada, the default rule is that directors and officers of Nevada corporations may
Id.
Wynn Complaint at 20.
223 Maggie Astor & Julie Creswell, Steve Wynn Resigns From Company Amid Sexual Misconduct
Allegations, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/business/stevewynn-resigns.html.
224 Wynn Complaint at 20.
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226 Id. at 12.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 34-39. The same law firm that represents the Norfolk County Retirement System filed a
second derivative action a week later on behalf of a Pennsylvania-based fund that manages pension
plans of construction industry workers. Press Release, Eglet Prince, Eglet Prince Has Filed A Second
Stockholder Derivative Complaint In Las Vegas Against Steve Wynn And Wynn Resorts Board Of
Directors (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/eglet-prince-has-filed-asecond-stockholder-derivative-complaint-in-las-vegas-against-steve-wynn-and-wynn-resorts-boardof-directors-300600198.html.
229 See id. at 3. Signet Jewelers is incorporated in Bermuda, which presumably is the reason why the
plaintiffs in the Signet Jewelers case are suing under federal securities law (which applies to U.S.-listed
companies regardless of legal domicile) and not bringing a derivative action. See Delian Naydenov, 3
Companies Calling Bermuda Home, Seeking Alpha (Oct. 17, 2013),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/1751872-3-companies-calling-bermuda-home.
230 See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free
Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935 (2012); Jens Dammann, How Lax Is Nevada Corporate Law? A
221
222

32

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

be held liable to shareholders only if their behavior was so egregious that it involved both a
breach of fiduciary duty and “intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.”231
While Wynn’s alleged conduct appears to be both intentional and a knowing violation of law,
shareholders may have difficulty establishing the liability of board members who ignored
Wynn’s pattern of harassment or allowed it to continue.
B. The Legal Framework
As illustrated in the previous Section, shareholder lawsuits stemming from corporate
sexual misconduct have become increasingly common in recent years, and as the #MeToo
movement continues to gain momentum, we predict that the trend will continue. Here, we
take stock of the legal tools available to investors seeking redress for sexual misconduct that
occurs at the firms in which they own shares. We focus in particular on the corporate law of
Delaware, where more than 66 percent of Fortune 500 firms are incorporated,232 and on
federal securities laws applicable to publicly traded companies.
1. Fiduciary Duties under Corporate Law
Corporate fiduciaries—the officers who manage company operations, as well as directors
who wield final decision-making authority—exercise control over the company on behalf of
the shareholders who are its owners. To protect the owners, corporate law subjects officers
and directors to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. If those fiduciary duties are violated,
shareholders may band together to bring a derivative suit against the corporation.233
The duty of care mandates that corporate fiduciaries exercise informed business
judgment in their stewardship of the company.234 Essentially, the duty of care requires
directors and officers to act with reasonable information and to proceed with a critical eye in
assessing such information in order to protect the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.235 The duty of care does not, however, mean that Delaware courts will secondguess every business decision that directors or officers make. Under the “business judgment

Response to Professor Barzuza, 99 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 1, 10 (2013) (disagreeing with Barzuza’s claim
that Nevada is a “liability-free jurisdiction” but acknowledging that Delaware’s approach to director
and officer liability is “more stringent” than Nevada’s).
231 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138(7).
232 Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual Report,
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
233 Because a derivative suit alleges a harm to the corporation, it belongs to the corporation. As such,
the shareholders must first make a demand on the directors to take on the litigation, unless such
actions would be futile because of a conflict of interest. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984). But if the shareholders are permitted to proceed with their action, they will be entitled to
reimbursement for the expenses associated with the claim. However, any proceeds from the action
will be remitted to the corporation. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff, & Laura Leedy Gansler,
Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Beseiging the Board § 14.06, Attorneys’ Fees and Incentive
Awards (2005).
234 Leo Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation
Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629 (2010).
235 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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rule,” Delaware courts will defer to any decision that can be attributed to some rational
corporate purpose, unless that decision was grossly negligent or made in bad faith.236
In addition, corporations can indemnify directors or officers for expenses incurred in
defending against allegations of the breach of the duty of care, so long as the director or
officer “acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation.”237 Finally, Delaware (like most other
states238) allows corporations to adopt a charter provision that exculpates directors from
liability for breaches of the duty of care, though Delaware’s exculpation does not apply to
officers.239
The duty of loyalty, by contrast, has traditionally been immutable under Delaware law.240
The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to “exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to
advance corporate purposes.”241 At its core, the duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from
putting their own interests ahead of those of the shareholders. Decisions regulated by the
duty of loyalty—such as transactions between the company and directors—do not receive
business judgment protection.242 Moreover, the Delaware statute that enables corporations
to adopt charter provisions that limit the liability of directors explicitly excludes the duty of
loyalty from its reach.243

The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
237 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2017).
238 See William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business
Organization 229, 246 (5th ed. 2016).
239 See id. § 102(b)(7) (empowering corporations to eliminate “the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director”).
Likewise, a corporate officer who is also a director would not be eligible for exculpation for duty
breaches committed as an officer. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 686 (Del. Ch. 2014).
240 Two caveats are necessary. First, since 2000, Delaware has granted corporations a statutory right
to waive a crucial part of the duty of loyalty: the corporate opportunities doctrine. Other states have
since followed Delaware’s lead, similarly permitting firms to execute “corporate opportunity
waivers.” Since inception, hundreds of corporations have adopted waivers. See Gabriel Rauterberg &
Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate
Opportunity
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Colum.
L.
Rev.
(forthcoming),
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Second, this analysis does not apply to the limited liability corporation (LLC), which is able
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Auriga Capital Corporation v. Gatz Properties, LLC, 2012 WL 361677 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2012); 6
Del. C. § 18-1101(c).
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Two types of duty-of-loyalty violations are especially relevant to board members in cases
of corporate sexual misconduct. First, Delaware courts have explained that “[i]llegal
corporate conduct is not loyal corporate conduct.”244 Thus, a director who “consciously
caus[es] the corporation to violate the law”—say, by enabling sexual harassment that violates
Title VII—thereby breaches the duty of loyalty and “could be forced to answer for the harm
he has caused.”245 To be sure, even this seemingly straightforward rule is uncertain at the
edges. The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance suggests that
“noncompliance with law may be justified under the concept of necessity in extraordinary
situations where compliance would inflict substantial harm on third parties, and
noncompliance would not.”246 Moreover, a “de minimis” principle may apply247: for example,
Stephen Bainbridge has observed that “[i]f a package delivery firm told its drivers to illegally
double-park, so as to speed up the delivery process, for example, it is hardly clear that
liability should follow.” 248
Second, directors can be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty when they fail to
exercise oversight of a corporation—but only when their failure is “sustained or
systematic.”249 This line of precedent originated from the Delaware Chancery Court’s 1996
decision In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.250 In that case, Caremark, a
healthcare corporation, was indicted in federal court on various charges related to illegal
kickbacks allegedly paid to a physician in exchange for prescribing Caremark-delivered
drugs.251 Caremark settled the federal litigation by pleading guilty to one count of mail fraud,
paying criminal fines, and making a monetary settlement of the civil claims. It also settled
private party lawsuits brought by insurance company payors who claimed damages arising
out of Caremark’s allegedly improper business practices.252 In total, Caremark paid about
$250 million to resolve these claims.253
In the wake of that litigation, shareholders filed five derivative suits against Caremark’s
board of directors, seeking to hold the directors liable for the losses Caremark had suffered.
The parties eventually settled, but in approving the settlement, Chancellor William Allen of
“liability-free” jurisdiction for managers. Barzuza, Market Segmentation, 98 Va. L. Rev. at 947-58.
Under Nevada law, the default rule provides for no liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty, absent
“intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.138(7) (2003).
244 In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., Civil Action No. 5215-VCG, 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 151, at *65 (Ch. Oct. 12, 2011); see Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 (“[O]ne cannot act loyally as a
corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.”).
245 Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007).
246 Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01 (Mar.
2018 update) (West).
247 Id.
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the Delaware Chancery Court took the opportunity to describe the oversight responsibilities
of corporate boards. In addition to liability for ill-advised decisions, according to Chancellor
Allen, “liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have
prevented the loss.”254 Chancellor Allen concluded that the board of directors’ duty to be
attentive to the business of the corporation “includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least,
render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal
standards.”255
Although the fiduciary duty at issue in the original Caremark decision was the duty of
care, the Caremark doctrine has since been recast under the duty of loyalty,256 meaning that
such claims are safe from exculpation under § 102(b)(7). This does not mean, however, that
it is easy for plaintiffs to prevail on a Caremark theory: as Chancellor Allen put it, a claim that
directors are subject to personal liability for oversight failures is “possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”257 To
prevail on a Caremark claim, the plaintiffs must either show “that the directors ‘utterly failed
to implement any reporting or information system or controls,’”258 or “that the board knew
of evidence of corporate misconduct—the proverbial ‘red flag’—yet acted in bad faith by
consciously disregarding its duty to address that misconduct.”259
Regardless of the form that a derivative action takes, the suit always must allege a harm
to the corporation. As such, the lawsuit belongs to the corporation. This means that a
shareholder will lack standing to bring a derivative suit unless the shareholder has demanded
that the directors pursue the corporate claim or shows that demand would be futile.260 The
latter path is the most likely to be successful for shareholders, as the board’s decision to
litigate the case or let it fall by the wayside will be respected “[e]xcept in extraordinary
cases.”261
Delaware case law provides two different frameworks for assessing demand futility. The
first, articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in the 1984 case Aronson v. Lewis,262 applies
when the derivative suit challenges a decision made by the same board that would consider
Id. at 968.
Id. at 970.
256 Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Although the Caremark decision is
rightly seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their
corporations’ compliance with legal standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the opinion
articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight that requires a showing that the directors
breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good faith.”).
257 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
258 Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *20 (Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) (quoting
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
259 Id. (quoting Reiter, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016)).
260 See Del. Ch. Ct. C.P.R. 23.1; Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990).
261 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv. Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
500 U.S. 90 (1991).
262 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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the demand.263 The second, announced nine years later in Rales v. Blasband,264applies “where
the board that would be considering the demand did not make a business decision which is
being challenged in the derivative suit.”265 This could be the case if a majority of the board
has been replaced since the time of the decision under attack, or if the suit does not attack a
specific decision, or if the decision under attack was made by the board of a different
company (e.g., prior to an acquisition).266
To illustrate: Imagine that the board approves the use of corporate funds to settle a
sexual harassment claim against the CEO, and that a majority of the current directors were
board members at the time of the original decision. In this case, Aronson would supply the
applicable test for demand futility. That test is two-pronged, and establishing one prong will
suffice for demand futility. The first prong asks whether the shareholders’ complaint creates
a “reasonable doubt” that “the directors are disinterested and independent.”267 Delaware
courts consult a range of factors when considering whether directors meet this standard.268
Close family connections are generally disqualifying. Chief Justice Leo Strine, then a ViceChancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court, has said that “if two brothers were on a
corporate board” and a “derivative action is filed targeting a transaction involving one of the
brothers,” then it is “easy” to conclude that the other brother would not be “disinterested
and independent.”269 Other ties—including financial entanglements and social
relationships—are also relevant to the judicial inquiry into disinterestedness and
independence.270
Aronson’s second prong, as originally articulated, asks whether the “particular facts
alleged” by the shareholder plaintiffs create a reasonable doubt that “the challenged
transaction was . . . the product of a valid business judgment.”271 “In simple terms,”
according to then-Vice Chancellor Strine, this “second prong of Aronson can be said to fulfill
two important integrity-assuring functions.”272 One is the concern that even a “putatively
independent board” will exhibit bias against shareholder plaintiffs.273 Thus, Aronson allows a
derivative action to go forward if the plaintiff can show “that the board’s decision was so
egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the
corporation’s best interests.”274 This might occur if the board “intentionally breaks the law,”
See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) (“The essential predicate for the Aronson
test is the fact that a decision of the board of directors is being challenged in the derivative suit.”).
264 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
265 Id. at 933-34.
266 Id. at 934.
267 Id. at 814.
268 See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 229 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[N]o single factor – such as receipt of
directorial compensation; family or social relationships; approval of the transaction attacked; or other
relationships with the corporation (e.g., attorney or banker) – may itself be dispositive in any
particular case.”).
269 See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937-38 (Del. Ch. 2003).
270 See id. at 938-39.
271 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
272 Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500.
273 Id.
274 Lenois v. Lawal, No. 11963-VCMR, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 784, at *30 (Ch. Nov. 7, 2017) (quoting
White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 544, 554 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
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or “intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation,” or “intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act.”275 The other
concern addressed by Aronson’s second prong is one that arises when “a derivative suit
demand asks directors to authorize a suit against themselves.”276 Thus, the Aronson
framework excuses demand when the derivative complaint alleges claims against the
directors and “the threat of liability to the directors . . . is sufficiently substantial to cast a
reasonable doubt over their impartiality.”277 Where the corporation has adopted a charter
provision pursuant to § 102(b)(7) that exculpates directors from duty-of-care liability,
demand will be excused if the plaintiffs can show that a majority of the board “faces a
substantial likelihood of liability” for “non-exculpated” (i.e., duty-of-loyalty) claims.278
To sum up so far: Aronson asks (1) whether a majority of the directors are “disinterested
and independent,” and if so, (2) whether a majority of the directors might nonetheless be
disqualified (a) because the decision under attack in the derivative suit was especially
“egregious or irrational,” or (b) because a majority of the directors themselves face a
“substantial likelihood” of liability for non-exculpated claims. But Aronson applies only when
a majority of the current board participated in the decision being challenged. Thus, if the
board approves the use of corporate funds to settle a sexual harassment claim against the
CEO but a majority of the board turns over before a derivative action is filed, Rales rather
than Aronson would govern the question of demand excusal. Likewise, if the derivative
complaint alleged a Caremark violation (i.e., a failure to act in the face of red flags), then there
would be no specific decision under attack and so Rales rather than Aronson would apply.279
The Rales test involves a “singular inquiry”: whether the allegations “create a reasonable
doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a
demand.”280 As a practical matter, this ends up looking a lot like prongs (1) and (2)(b) of
Aronson. Courts applying the Rales test ask whether a majority of the directors “can act
independently” of the defendants in the derivative action or whether a majority of the
directors “face a substantial likelihood of personal liability themselves.”281 Again, demand
will be excused if a majority of the board is biased by factors such as familial, financial,
professional, and social ties or faces a real risk of personal liability for non-exculpated claims.
Finally, even if demand would be excused under the Aronson or Rales tests, a board
nonetheless can cause a derivative action to be dismissed by using a so-called “special
litigation committee” (SLC) composed of disinterested and independent directors who make
up a minority of the board. The special litigation committee must make “an objective and
thorough investigation of the derivative suit,” and if it concludes that the suit should be
dismissed, the committee can file a motion supported by a “thorough written record of the

Id. at *30-31.
Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500.
277 Id. at 501.
278 See Lenois, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 784, at *41-44 (collecting cases).
279 Oklahoma Firefighters, C.A. No. 12151-VCG; City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good,
2017 WL 6397490, at *1 (Del. Dec. 15, 2017).
280 Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501; see Rales, 634 A.2d at 934.
281 Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275
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investigation and its findings and recommendations.”282 If that decision is challenged, the
court will engage in a two-step review of the SLC’s recommendation. At the first step, the
court will consider whether the committee “was independent and showed reasonable bases
for good faith findings and recommendations.”283 While boards generally enjoy a
presumption of independence in the demand-excusal context, the Delaware Supreme Court
has said that “the SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a yardstick
that must be like Caesar’s wife—above reproach.”284 If the SLC can satisfy this high standard
and show that it carried out the required investigation, then the court will proceed to the
second step and decide whether the SLC’s motion to dismiss should be granted.285 The
question for the court at this second step is “whether the SLC’s recommended result falls
within a range of reasonable outcomes” that a disinterested, independent, and informed
director could accept.286 This second step provides an opportunity for the court to conduct a
substantive review of the SLC’s conclusion and to keep alive a meritorious derivative suit
over the objections of even an independent SLC.287
2. Securities Law
Aside from the corporate law of a company’s state of incorporation, publicly traded
companies are governed by federal (as well as state288) securities law. In some instances,
federal securities laws saddle public companies with affirmative duties to disclose certain
information to shareholders.289 Perhaps most significantly, Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides that every issuer of a security on a national securities
exchange must file annual reports with the SEC in accordance with the Commission’s rules
and regulations, and must file “such information and documents as the Commission shall
require” in order to keep the issuer’s registration statement “reasonably current.”290 For
present purposes, the most important set of SEC rules defining the affirmative disclosure
duties of public companies is found in Regulation S-K.291
Even when there is no affirmative duty to disclose, Rule 10b-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful for a company to utter “any untrue statement of
material fact” in connection with a securities transaction and “to omit to state a material
fact” that is necessary to render another statement “not misleading.”292 An omission is
See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 788-89.
284 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1056 (Del. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
285 Id. at 789.
286 In re Primedia Inc., 67 A.3d 455, 468 (Del. Ch. 2013).
287 Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786.
288 In addition to the SEC, which regulates and enforces the federal securities laws, each state has its
own securities regulator who enforces “blue sky” laws that govern securities sold within each state.
Although this Article focuses on federal securities law, we note that states may have the power to
bring actions against securities violators under their own laws.
289 As just one example, Regulation FD requires companies to disclose material information to
investors at the same time. See 17 C.F.R. § 243
290 15 U.S.C. § 78m; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (a) (registration required for securities to be traded on national
securities exchange).
291 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.
292 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
282
283

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

“material,” according to the Supreme Court, if “the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.”293
The distinction between a Regulation S-K violation and a Rule 10b-5 violation is
meaningful for enforcement purposes. The SEC can bring an enforcement action under
either Regulation S-K or Rule 10b-5, but some federal courts have held that there is no
private right of action for a Regulation S-K violation (this issue is currently the subject of
circuit split).294 By contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action under
Rule 10b-5, meaning that investors can recover damages from public companies and
individual officers for violations of the rule.295 To be sure, there are still high hurdles to
recovery under Rule 10b-5: among others, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff always will have to prove
that the defendant acted “with a wrongful state of mind,”296 and must in her complaint “state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”297 As we shall see, there may be circumstances in which a Regulation
S-K violation also gives rise to a Rule 10b-5 violation, though it is clear that not every
Regulation S-K violation can support a private action.
A number of affirmative disclosure obligations under Regulation S-K are conceivably
relevant to companies facing sexual harassment claims. For example, Item 103 of Regulation
S-K mandates disclosure of “any material legal proceedings” currently pending against a
company, as well as “any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental
authorities.”298 Several courts have held, though, that Item 103 does not require a company
to disclose the mere fact that it is under investigation by federal and state authorities,299
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The materiality standard is often assessed relative to the size of the firm,
which means that for large firms, the materiality threshold is much higher. This standard therefore
provides a safety net for companies that fail to disclose information that would certainly rise to the
level of materiality at smaller firms, leading to “materiality blindspots.” See George Georgiev, Too
Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 602
(2017).
294 See Srebnik v. Dean, Civil Action No. 05-cv-01086-WYD-MJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73836, at
*9 (D. Colo. Sep. 26, 2006) (collecting cases); Linda L. Griggs, John J. Huber & Christian J. Mixter,
When Rules Collide—Leidos, the Supreme Court, and the Risk to the MD&A, Bloomberg Law:
Securities & Capital Markets (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.bna.com/rules-collideleidos-supremen73014470276 (overview of statutory and regulatory scheme).
295 Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971); see also
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008) (reaffirming
private right of action).
296 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (2005).
297 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
298 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. Relatedly, accounting rules require the disclosure of any “loss
contingency”—“an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to
possible gain (gain contingency) or loss (loss contingency) to an entity that will ultimately be resolved
when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.” See Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Contingencies (Topic 450): Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies (2010). Pending or threatened
litigation is one example and must be disclosed if it can result in a “material loss.”
299 See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. MetLife, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (no obligation to disclose the fact that authorities in approximately thirty states are
investigating insurance company for violating unclaimed property laws); Richman v. Goldman Sachs
293

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

although misleading statements about the investigation are of course actionable under Rule
10b-5.300 Moreover, Regulation S-K specifically states that “[n]o information need be given
with respect to any proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount
involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets” of
the company and its subsidiaries.301 An aggregation rule requires companies to count all
proceedings that “present[] in large degree the same legal and factual issues” toward that 10
percent threshold,302 but even so, the 10 percent rule means that most damages claims
against large publicly traded companies will not need to be disclosed under Item 103.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K imposes a broader—and more amorphous—disclosure duty
on public companies. It requires disclosure of, among other information, “any known trends
or uncertainties that have had or that the company reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing
operations.”303 This expansive disclosure mandate has been the source of much litigation and
is now the subject of an important circuit split. The Second Circuit has held that a public
company’s failure to make an Item 303 disclosure of a material fact can give rise to liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,304 because “[d]ue to the obligatory nature” of
Regulation S-K, “a reasonable investor would interpret the absence of an Item 303
disclosure to imply the nonexistence of known trends or uncertainties that the registrant
reasonably expects will have a material unfavorable impact on revenues or income from
continuing operations.”305 On this view, the omission of material trends or uncertainties
from an Item 303 disclosure makes the rest of the company’s annual report misleading. The
Ninth Circuit has rejected this view and held that a company’s failure to comply with Item
303 is not actionable under Rule 10b-5.306 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in March
2017 to resolve this split,307 but that case is on hold while the parties seek to work out a
settlement.308 In the meantime, uncertainty regarding the consequences of Item 303
noncompliance lingers.

Grp., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (no obligation to disclose SEC “Wells Notice”
informing company that agency may bring civil action); see also ABA Disclosure Obligations under
the Federal Securities Laws in Government Investigations—Part II.C.; Regulation S-K, Item 103:
Disclosure of “Legal Proceedings,” 64 Bus. Law. 973 (2009) (“An investigation on its own is not a
'pending legal proceeding' until it reaches a stage when the agency or prosecutorial authority makes
known that it is contemplating filing suit or bringing charges.”).
300 See Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
301 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 instruction (2).
302 Id.
303 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
304 Stratte-Mcclure v. Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101-04 (2d Cir. 2015).
305 Id. at 102 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
306 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. (In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig.), 768 F.3d 1046, 1054-56 (9th Cir.
2014).
307 Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017).
308 Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 138 S. Ct. 369 (2017); see Andrew Chang, U.S. Top Court
Drops Leidos Contracting Fraud Case After Settlement, Reuters (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-securities/u-s-top-court-drops-leidos-contractingfraud-case-after-settlement-idUSKBN1CM2C0.
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Finally, Item 402 under Regulation S-K requires each public company to publish details
on compensation paid to its CEO, CFO, and the three other most highly paid individuals.309
The required disclosure includes “perquisites,”310 and the SEC has a history of investigating
and charging companies that fail to disclose perquisites and benefits for top executives. For
example, in 2004, GE settled SEC charges after divorce papers revealed that General
Electric’s former CEO Jack Welch had received perquisites and benefits—including a luxury
Manhattan apartment, a chauffeured limousine, and unlimited access to a GE aircraft for
personal use—far in excess of those disclosed to GE’s shareholders.311 In April 2005, the
SEC sued Tyson Foods, as well as the company’s CEO Don Tyson, for its failure to disclose
various perquisites to its CEO, including the personal use of company-owned homes in the
English countryside and on the western coast of Mexico as well as oriental rugs, expensive
antiques, and free lawn care.312 In settling those charges, the SEC required Don Tyson to
reimburse the company for millions of dollars of expenses.313 A year later, in April 2006,
Tyco International reached a settlement with the SEC for, among other things, its failure to
disclose lavish prerequisites to its CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, including a $6,000 shower
curtain and a $15,000 “dog umbrella stand.”314
In response to these and other high-profile enforcement actions, the SEC significantly
expanded the perquisite disclosure requirement by lowering the threshold triggering
disclosure from $50,000 to $10,000 and demanding a new table to identify and quantify any
perquisite exceeding $10,000.315 But while a failure to disclose a perquisite in excess of
$10,000 would violate Item 402, it is not clear that this would lead to liability under Rule
10b-5 (and thus, a private right of action for investors). Recall that those provisions apply to
material facts and omissions. Thus, the fact that a company gave its CEO a $20,000 oriental
rug would need to be disclosed under Item 402, but without other damning facts, it would
be difficult to show that the company’s failure to reveal that fact would be material to
shareholders and potential investors.
However, Rule 10b-5 also governs other types of public statements, even those that are
voluntary. For example, Apple became the subject of an SEC investigation after its thenCEO, Steve Jobs, told the public in January 2009 that his gaunt appearance was the result of
a “relatively simple” hormone imbalance, whose remedy would be “simple and
straightforward.”316 That disclosure, which most likely was not mandated by SEC rules,317
Id. § 229.402.
Id.
311 Securities and Exchange Commission Release 2004-135 (Sept. 23, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-135.htm.
312 Deborah Solomon, In SEC Complaint, Tale of Chicken Mogul Feathering His Nest, Wall St. J.
(Apr. 29, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111470683583119695.
313 Id.
314 Securities and Exchange Commission Release 2006-58 (Apr. 17, 2006); Tyco International,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 10, 2002).
315 See Securities and Exchange Commission Release 33-8732 (Aug. 11, 2006).
316 Nicholas Carlson, Steve Jobs’ Health Likely Caused Him To Skip Macworld, Business Insider
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/steve-jobs-addresses-his-health-in-openletter-aapl.
317 See Patricia Sanchez Abril & Ann M. Olazabal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the
Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1545, 1590-1604 (2009).
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drove Apple’s stock price up by 4%. Nine days later, Jobs told the public he would take five
months off to recover from a more complex health problem,318 and in April 2009, Jobs
underwent a liver transplant that he initially kept secret.319 These events prompted the SEC
to open an investigation to determine whether the January 5 statements were misleading.320
The SEC probe did not yield charges against Apple or against Jobs, who died of cancer in
2011,321 and it is not clear whether Apple or Jobs was fully aware of Jobs’s health problems
at the time of his initial statement. The episode nonetheless illustrates the fact that a public
company puts itself at risk of liability under federal securities laws if it makes untrue or
incomplete statements about its CEO that mislead investors into thinking that the CEO will
remain in that post much longer than is indeed likely.
In some circuits, courts interpret Rule 10b-5 to impose liability not only for statements
that are false and misleading at the time that they are made, but also for those that have
become misleading over time. For example, the Second Circuit has said that a “duty to
update opinions and projections may arise” under Rule 10b-5 “if the original opinions or
projections have become misleading as the result of intervening events,” though that court
cautioned that the duty depends upon whether the prior statements are “definite” or merely
aspirational.322 In one Second Circuit case, a company that had contracted with the U.S.
Postal Service announced that it had reached an “agreement in principle” with the Postal
Service to amend its contract, but the company did not correct that disclosure once it
became clear that the Postal Service would not accede to the amendment. The Second
Circuit held that the company could be held liable under Rule 10b-5 and allowed a
shareholder lawsuit to proceed beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage.323 Other courts have
acknowledged a duty to update under limited conditions. For example, the Third Circuit has
held that the duty to update applies in “narrow circumstances” involving “fundamental
corporate changes such as mergers, takeovers, or liquidations, as well as when subsequent
events produce an extreme or radical change in the continuing validity of the original
statement.”324 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit maintains that there is no “duty to update” a
“forward-looking statement” that “because of subsequent events becomes untrue.”325
To sum up so far: Publicly traded companies can be held liable to investors for untrue
statements of material fact and for material omissions. These companies also face affirmative
duties to disclose under Regulation S-K, but the failure to comply with that regulation will
not always lead to liability to investors. Publicly traded companies are also subject to a “duty
to update” in some—but not all—jurisdictions. In the following Section, we will discuss how
these obligations and principles of state corporate law intersect with sexual harassment cases.
Nicholas Carlson, SEC Investigates Apple, Jobs, Business Insider (July 8, 2009),
http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-steve-jobs-undergo-sec-investigation-2009-7.
319 Yukari Iwatani Kane & Joann S. Lublin, Jobs Had Liver Transplant, Wall St. J. (June 20, 2009),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124546193182433491.
320 See Carlson, supra note 318.
321 See Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs 481 (2011) (noting that “[t]he SEC investigation ended up going
nowhere”).
322 In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
323 Illinois State Bd. of Inv. v. Authentidate Holding Corp., 369 Fed. App’x 260, 263, 265 (2d 2010).
324 See, e.g., City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 176 (3d Cir. 2014).
325 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995).
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C. The Potential for Liability
Under what circumstances will the legal framework outlined above support successful
shareholder actions against corporations and corporate fiduciaries following revelations of
sexual misconduct? The answer varies across four categories of shareholder claims. First and
most straightforwardly, fiduciaries violate the duty of loyalty when they engage in harassment
themselves. Second, corporate fiduciaries who fail to monitor harassment at their firms may
be liable in certain circumstances under a Caremark theory. Third, corporate fiduciaries who
are aware of harassment but fail to react—or who affirmatively enable harassment to
continue—may be sued for breach of the duties of care and loyalty, though this is perhaps
the category in which the doctrinal case for liability is weakest. Fourth and finally,
corporations and their officers and directors face potential liability under the federal
securities statutes when they make inaccurate or misleading statements regarding workplace
sexual misconduct. In this Section, we discuss the factors that determine whether courts will
find defendants liable under each of these theories.
1. Corporate Fiduciary as Harasser
Our analysis begins with perhaps the most obvious claim: an action against a corporate
fiduciary who engages in misconduct himself or herself. The Weinstein case is the most
widely publicized (and among the most egregious) examples of the corporate fiduciary as
harasser, but Weinstein is not alone in this regard. The cases of Mark Hurd at HewlettPackard, Dov Charney at American Apparel, and—more recently—Travis Kalanick at
Uber,326 Roger Ailes at Fox News, Mark Light at Signet Jewelers, John Hewitt at Liberty Tax,
and Steve Wynn of the Wynn Resorts casino chain327 all appear to fall within the first
category. As we shall see, the corporate-fiduciary-as-harasser fact pattern will be the one in
which liability is most likely.
Whether framed as a violation of the duty of care that lies outside the protections of the
business judgment rule or as a violation of the duty of loyalty, sexual harassment by a
corporate officer almost certainly constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Where a fiduciary
“intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation,”328 the fiduciary’s bad-faith conduct can be the basis for liability. And when a
CEO or other corporate officer uses his position of power to harass, intimidate, or assault
employees, he clearly acts for a purpose other than that of advancing the company’s
interests.329 The consequences for the firm go well beyond the risk of liability: sexual
See Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. Times (June 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html.
327 See Alexandra Berzon et al., Dozens of People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las
Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, Wall. St. J. (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-ofpeople-recount-pattern-of-sexual-misconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953.
328 Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
329 While we know of no Delaware precedent precisely on point, a state appellate court in
Massachusetts has concluded that an officer’s sexual harassment of an employee can constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty. See Prozinski v. Ne. Real Estate Servs., 797 N.E.2d 415, 423-24 (Mass. App.
2003) (where officer “allegedly embarked on a course of sexual harassment of [a] receptionist,” his
“placement of his own interests above those of the company he served could be found by a fact
finder to constitute an act of disloyalty”).
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harassment in the workplace potentially damages employee morale, drives talented
individuals away from the firm, and endangers the company’s reputation.
However, one daunting obstacle remains. As noted above, a shareholder-plaintiff
bringing a derivative action must show demand futility or else must allow the board to
decide whether to bring suit. Where the allegation is that an officer violated his fiduciary
duty by committing sexual harassment, the shareholder derivative action challenges the
conduct of an officer rather than a decision of the board, and so Rales rather than Aronson
supplies the applicable framework for evaluating demand futility. Under Rales, demand will
be excused if shareholders can show that a majority of the board is not disinterested and
independent or if it can show that board members face a substantial likelihood of personal
liability (e.g., on account of Caremark violations arising from a failure to monitor a sexualharasser CEO). The pension-fund plaintiff in the Twenty-First Century Fox case pursued
both approaches,330 and the plaintiffs in the Liberty Tax and Wynn lawsuits are following the
same two-pronged strategy.331 Insofar as plaintiffs seek to show lack of independence, the
outcome of the demand-excusal inquiry will depend on company- and director-specific
factors that are no different in the sexual harassment context than in any other. Insofar as
plaintiffs seek to show a substantial likelihood of director liability, then the question of
demand excusal in corporate-fiduciary-as-harasser cases will overlap with the questions of
director liability in the corporate-fiduciary-as-monitor and corporate-fiduciary-as-enabler
contexts. We turn first to the failure-to-monitor line of argument and then consider when
and whether corporate fiduciaries might be held liable for enabling harassment to occur at
their companies.
2. Corporate Fiduciary as (Failed) Monitor
Under some circumstances, shareholders may be able to hold directors liable under a
Caremark theory for failing to monitor sexual harassment at their firms. Since Caremark
claims now sound in the duty of loyalty, exculpation clauses enacted pursuant to § 102(b)(7)
would not immunize directors, making the Caremark line of argument especially appealing
for plaintiffs. Moreover, a substantial likelihood of Caremark liability will render a director
conflicted for purposes of evaluating demand futility. Thus, Caremark claims against directors
can enable shareholders to pursue derivative actions against CEOs or other officers who
engage in harassment themselves.
While Caremark claims rarely succeed, the Weinstein Company directors’ conduct is one
of the few situations in which Caremark liability would be likely if shareholders were to sue.
In October 2017, 84 women—all of whom were employees or potential employees of the
Weinstein Company—came forward with allegations of sexual misconduct against
Weinstein, the Company’s CEO. The alleged incidents extended as far back as 1984, and
many came after Weinstein and his brother Bob broke away from Miramax Films in 2005
and founded the Weinstein Company. Several of the accusations resulted in legal settlements
in which Weinstein’s accusers agreed to confidentiality clauses that barred them from

330
331

See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17, at 52-65.
Hewitt Complaint, supra note 19, at 22-25; Wynn Complaint, supra note 20, at 23-33.
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speaking about their experiences. Immediately after the allegations came to light, the board
professed ignorance, saying that the allegations came as an “utter surprise.”332
Delaware courts have said that Caremark liability may arise when “red flags … are either
waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”333 For the
Weinstein Company board, red flags flew all around. Harvey Weinstein’s unwanted sexual
advances had become such an “open secret” in the entertainment industry that the television
show 30 Rock joked about Weinstein’s misconduct in a 2012 episode334 and the comedian
Seth MacFarlane alluded to Weinstein’s behavior at the Oscars the following year.335 A
female executive circulated a memo in 2015 that, according to The New York Times, informed
directors that Weinstein had created a “toxic environment for women” at the company.336
Board members also reportedly approved a contract with Weinstein in 2015 that expressly
contemplated the possibility of further claims against the producer and protected him from
termination—all without dipping into his personnel file themselves.337 In other words, the
board’s statement professing ignorance in the face of serious red flags only strengthens a
potential Caremark claim, as it indicates that the board failed for years to respond to warning
signs indicating that Weinstein posed a serious risk to employees and the company.
Why has a shareholder suit not come, in spite of the strength of the facts supporting the
Caremark claim? The likely answer is that the Weinstein Company is a Delaware LLC, which
means that the company can waive fiduciary duties for officers and directors in the operating
agreement.338 Because these documents need not be made public, we cannot be sure whether
the Weinstein Company has adopted a waiver, nor can we know exactly how often LLCs
choose to waive such duties. What we can say is that the rise in LLCs and other
“uncorporations” may affect the availability of the shareholder suit as a tool for redress
following harassment allegations.339

See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Lund, It May Not Matter What The Weinstein Company Knew,
The Atlantic (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/harveyweinstein-company-legal-consequences/542838.
333 In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654-55 (Del. Ch. 2008).
334 See Jacob Stolworthy, 30 Rock joke referenced Harvey Weinstein allegations in 2012, The
Independent
(Oct.
11,
2017),
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336 Jodi Kantor & Meghan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for
Decades, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinsteinharassment-allegations.html.
337 See Harvey Weinstein’s Contract Allowed for Sexual Harassment, TMZ (Oct. 12, 2017),
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For Delaware corporations like Twenty-First Century Fox, however, the duty of loyalty
is unwaivable. And the allegations in the Fox News complaint, if substantiated, strongly
indicate that shareholders would prevail in their Caremark claim on the grounds that the
board failed to respond to red flags indicating that toxic work environment existed at the
news network. These red flags include a 2004 sexual harassment lawsuit by a Fox News
producer against anchor Bill O’Reilly,340 a 2006 settlement of an EEOC lawsuit against a Fox
vice president,341 a 2011 settlement of a sexual harassment lawsuit against Ailes by a former
employee,342 and a 2014 publication of a biography of Ailes, The Loudest Voice in the Room,
which alleged decades of sexual harassment by its subject.343 But despite these and other red
flags, there is no evidence that the board investigated or responded to sexual harassment
issues at the company until former anchor Gretchen Carlson sued Ailes in July 2016.344
Although the settlement of the shareholder derivative action prevented the court from
resolving loyalty claims against Fox fiduciaries, the board’s failure to monitor its CEO and its
employees in its most important business units, implement sexual harassment prevention
protocols, and investigate red flags might well have been sufficient for liability under
Caremark.345
To be sure, not every case of sexual harassment by a corporate officer will lead to
Caremark liability for directors. While the plaintiff in White v. Panic chose not to pursue a
Caremark theory,346 the Chancery Court nonetheless noted that a Caremark claim would not
have been possible because the board had indeed responded to the CEO’s harassment.347
Among other steps, the board formed a special committee in 1995 to review sexual
harassment claims against the CEO and hired outside counsel to investigate the

and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs were Taxed for Tax Years
2002-2006, 15 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 459, 460 (2010).
340 Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, N.Y. Times (April 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-foxnews.html. The company also protected O’Reilly from termination because of sexual harassment,
specifying that termination for harassment was “expressly limited to a final, non-appealable judgment
by a court of law finding that Performer sexually harassed an employee of Fox.” This contractual
protection meant that when the company finally fired O’Reilly, he was entitled to a $25 million
severance payment. See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17, at 44.
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Harassment, Vox (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/15/12416662/roger-ailes-foxsexual-harassment-women-list.
344 See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
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allegations.348 Whether or not those steps were adequate, they amount to more than the
“utter failure” of oversight that characterizes a Caremark violation.349
Even more troubling from a potential plaintiff’s perspective is the rejection of Caremark
liability in the American Apparel case. Recall that CEO Dov Charney’s sexual misconduct was
well-documented many years before the EEOC’s 2010 finding against the company.350 The
fact that Charney had masturbated in front of a female journalist had been reported in the
New York Times as early as 2006, and Charney did not dispute the accuracy of the report.351
Nonetheless, the district court in the American Apparel case said that “the bare allegation that
Charney’s sexual proclivities were widely known is insufficient to support a lack of oversight
claim,”352 and the fact that these allegations were supported by “multiple sources”—
including articles in reputable newspapers—apparently left the court unmoved.353
Only six years have elapsed since American Apparel, so it is difficult to dismiss the case as
an artifact of a bygone era. The judge in that case, Margaret Morrow, a Clinton appointee,
was the first female president of the State Bar of California,354 and it would be presumptuous
to claim that she was insensitive to the plight of women in the workplace. Even so, societal
attitudes toward allegations of sexual harassment have changed dramatically in the short time
since that case was decided. We expect that a court confronted with the same facts today
would consider the reports of Charney’s masturbation in front of a female journalist as well
as the series of sexual harassment claims against him and the company to be just the sort of
“red flags” that require a board to investigate further. The fact that Twenty-First Century
Fox chose not to contest the claims against its board members—and that Twenty-First
Century Fox’s insurer agreed to pay out on these claims—arguably indicates that
sophisticated actors share our impression of the viability of Caremark claims in a postWeinstein world.
3. Corporate Fiduciary as Enabler
Aside from arguing that board members have breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
monitor sexual misconduct, shareholders also may attack the board for enabling harassment
to continue. We can foresee at least two scenarios in which such claims might arise: when
the board approves contract terms that protect a CEO or corporate officer from the
consequences of sexual misconduct and when the board approves the use of corporate
funds to settle sexual harassment claims or to indemnify the perpetrator.
Start with the scenario in which board members approve provisions in the contracts of
CEOs and corporate officers that shield those individuals from the consequences of sexual
misconduct. Such provisions arguably existed in the extension of the contract with Harvey
Id. at 368.
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
350 See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
351 See Holson, supra note 157.
352 In re Am. Apparel S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV 10-06576 MMM (RCx), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146970, at *100 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012).
353 See id. at *100-104.
354 See Henry Weinstein, 2 Lawyers Urged for Federal Bench, L.A. Times (Sept. 23, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-23/local/me-48941_1_los-angeles-lawyers.
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Weinstein that was approved by the board of the Weinstein Company in 2015. According to
a complaint filed by the New York State Attorney General in an effort to block the
Weinstein Company’s sale, the contract extension permitted the board to terminate
Weinstein for violating the company’s code of conduct only if the violation was “willful” and
both a majority of the board and Weinstein’s brother and co-CEO, Bob Weinstein,
determined that the misconduct had “caused serious harm to the company.”355 The contract
extension also imposed escalating penalties on Weinstein that would apply if the company
had to make a payment arising from Weinstein’s misconduct, but no such penalties if
Weinstein bore the cost of such a claim himself.356 According to the New York State
Attorney General, the contract extension effectively allowed Weinstein to “continue
engaging in sexual harassment and misconduct with impunity, provided that he paid the
costs of any settlements” (and provided that he complied with certain confidentiality
provisions in the agreement).357
Could a shareholder successfully argue that the board’s approval of such a contract
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty? Recall that duty-of-care claims against directors will
likely be subject to exculpation under § 102(b)(7). In most cases, therefore, shareholderplaintiffs will be better off pursing a duty-of-loyalty claim.
We can imagine two paths that a shareholder-plaintiff might take in this scenario. The
first—and least promising—is to argue that by approving the contract, the board consciously
caused the company to violate the law.358 Remember that under the alter ego doctrine, sexual
harassment by a corporate officer is imputed to the employer;359 thus, Weinstein’s sexual
harassment caused the company to be in violation of Title VII. The challenge would be to
show that the board—by approving the contractual provision described in the New York
State Attorney General’s complaint—consciously caused Weinstein to commit sexual
harassment. This may be somewhat of a leap: To say that the board caused Weinstein to
commit harassment seems to stretch the bounds of the causation concept. For that reason,
shareholder-plaintiffs may turn toward a second—and somewhat more promising—line of
argument in these contract-focused cases. However, a shareholder-plaintiff may be able to
avoid the causation inquiry by showing that the directors’ business strategy purposefully
skirted the law. If the board made the determination that a top executive was harassing
employees but that the best course of action for the company was to deliver contractual
protections that would allow the harasser to continue his or her illegal behavior, that conduct
would almost certainly constitute the kind of conscious violation of Title VII necessary to
sustain a Caremark claim.360

Petition at 30, State v. Weinstein Co. LLC, No. _____ (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2018),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/weinstein_company.pdf.
356 Id. at 31.
357 Id.
358 See supra note 244-245.
359 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
360 See In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *20 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2011) (“Delaware law does not charter law breakers. . . [A] fiduciary of a Delaware corporation
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The second and related line of argument returns to the Caremark standard but this time
focuses on the first prong: “that the directors ‘utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls.’”361 The Weinstein Company board effectively ceded its
ability to control Weinstein’s conduct to the producer’s brother, who had veto power over
any decision to fire the producer for misconduct. To be sure, the strict formalist might argue
that the board did not fail to implement any controls, as control by the producer’s brother—
himself a board member—still amounted to some control. But while it does not fit neatly into
the typical Caremark fact pattern, the Weinstein case might well constitute the sort of utter
failure of oversight that Caremark covers.
A second scenario in which shareholders might seek to hold board members liable for
enabling sexual misconduct arises when the board approves the use of corporate funds to
settle sexual harassment claims against a CEO or other officers without demanding that the
officer reimburse the firm. For example, ICN allegedly paid $3.5 million to settle eight sexual
harassment lawsuits against CEO Ivan Panic and guaranteed a bank loan to Panic so that he
could settle a paternity suit brought by a former employee.362 American Apparel reportedly
paid more than $3 million to settle claims involving CEO Dov Charney.363 Twenty-First
Century Fox allegedly paid more than $55 million to settle sexual harassment and
discrimination claims against Roger Ailes and other Fox News executives.364 The board of
online lender SoFi appears to have approved a $75,000 settlement paid to a departing female
employee who received sexually explicit text messages from Cagney, but kept Cagney as
CEO for roughly five more years.365 In cases such as those, shareholders might argue that
board members breached their fiduciary duty of care by allowing the CEO—in effect—to
expend corporate funds in pursuit of personal gratification.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Panic, however, casts doubt on the
viability of such claims. There, the court said that that “the plaintiff has not pleaded facts
indicating that the challenged settlements were anything other than routine business
decisions in the interest of the corporation.” Instead, “the alleged settlements, in which
neither Panic nor ICN admitted wrongdoing, are consistent with a desire to be rid of strike
suits and to avoid the cost of protracted litigation.”366 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the plaintiff in White had failed to rebut the business judgment presumption applicable to his
duty-of-care claims against ICN’s directors (and thus could not get beyond the demand
requirement in order to bring a claim against Panic).367 That decision is particularly ominous
Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *20 (Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) (quoting
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
362 White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 548 & n.7 (Del. 2001).
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364 See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17, at 5, 25.
365 See James Rufus Koren, CEO Resignation, Sexual Harassment Suit Could Delay SoFi’s Bank
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for shareholder-plaintiffs in cases in which corporate directors are shielded from duty-ofcare liability by § 102(b)(7) exculpation elections.
Nonetheless, there are at least two ways in which board approval of sexual harassment
settlements might advance a shareholder-plaintiff’s cause. First, when it appears that the
board has in effect written a blank check to a CEO that allows him to engage in sexual
harassment and charge the costs to the corporation, then the argument that the directors are
not disinterested and independent may seem stronger. While we doubt that approval of
settlements, standing alone, will disqualify a board at the demand-excusal stage, this is one
fact that may weigh in favor of allowing a derivative action to proceed over the board’s
objection. Second, when a board approves the settlement of sexual harassment claims
against a CEO without undertaking a thorough investigation of those allegations, then the
case for Caremark liability gains steam. It is hard to imagine a more obvious “red flag” then
the fact that an officer’s alleged misconduct has begun to cost the company financially.
To sum up: Any case against corporate fiduciaries as enablers of sexual harassment is
likely to encounter several obstacles, the most significant of which is the fact that
exculpatory provisions generally require shareholder-plaintiffs to go beyond showing that a
director breached the duty of care. Even so, boards that approve contract provisions that
protect CEOs or other corporate officers from the consequences of harassment or that
approve the use of corporate funds to settle sexual harassment claims expose themselves to
the possibility of Caremark liability in some cases. Such approvals also may strengthen the
plaintiff’s hand at the demand-excusal stage.
Finally, it is worth noting that the best legal strategy for board members in cases of CEO
sexual harassment might be in tension with the optimal public relations approach. If the
board avers that it was aware of sexual harassment claims against the CEO but made a
business judgment to address the matter internally, then shareholder-plaintiffs will face
difficulty in proving that the decision was not just a violation of the duty of care but also a
duty-of-loyalty breach. In many circumstances, however, we expect that board members will
respond as the Weinstein Company board did—by contending that the allegations came as
an utter surprise.368 The problem with this defense, however, is that it tees up a Caremark
claim quite nicely: If the board remained unaware of repeated sexual harassment allegations
against a CEO, then that raises questions about the adequacy of its internal monitoring
system and suggests that it may have consciously ignored red flags. Professing ignorance may
seem like an attractive response for board members seeking to absolve themselves in the
eyes of the public, but it also may place them on the wrong side of Delaware law.
4. Material Misstatements and Omissions
So far our analysis of potential liability has focused on state corporate law—and in
particular, the law of Delaware. A fourth and final category of potential liability arises under
federal securities law. We focus here on two ways in which publicly traded companies might
run afoul of federal securities law: when the failure to reveal sexual harassment amounts to a
See Mike Fleming Jr., Weinstein Company Board Declares: We Had No Idea, Deadline
Hollywood (Oct. 10, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/10/weinstein-company-board-we-had-noidea-1202186015.
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breach of an affirmative duty to disclose and when the company makes misleading
statements connected to sexual misconduct.
We begin with the possibility of an affirmative duty to disclose sexual harassment. Only
in rare circumstances will such a duty arise under Item 103 of Regulation S-K, which
addresses disclosure of material legal proceedings. As noted above, in very few cases will
damages claims alleging sexual harassment—alone or in combination—exceed 10 percent of
corporate assets and thus need to be disclosed under Item 103.369 Of course, a company may
voluntarily disclose legal proceedings under Item 103, but such disclosures should be crafted
carefully. In one instance, the EEOC found “reasonable cause” to believe that an employer
violated Title VII when its annual 10-K filing revealed the name of a former employee with a
pending sexual harassment claim against the company and characterized the claim as
“meritless.”370 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the disclosure “constituted a material adverse
employment action” because it “might be negatively viewed by future employers” and
dismissed the employer’s contention that the disclosure was necessary to comply with SEC
regulations.371 In other words, the argument that Item 103 mandates disclosure of sexual
harassment claims is—as the Seventh Circuit seemed to recognize—questionable at best.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which in relevant part requires public companies to disclose
“known trends or uncertainties that . . . the company reasonably expects will have a material
. . . unfavorable impact on . . . income from continuing operations,”372 is an uncertain
foundation for liability as well. Recall that the federal courts of appeals are split as to whether
a company or its officers ever can be held liable to shareholders for Item 303
noncompliance, and that the Second Circuit is friendlier toward Item 303 claims than several
of its sister circuits.373 In the CTPartners case, a federal district court in the Southern District
of New York nonetheless rejected shareholders’ Item 303-based claims against the company
and its top executives. According to the court:
Plaintiff’s thesis that the executives’ boorish behavior would ultimately impact the
bottom line . . . requires one to have foreseen, essentially, that this behavior would be
scandalously revealed, as it was in the New York Post, and provoke such executive suite
turbulence so as to impair the Company’s financial condition or operational results.
Except with the benefit of hindsight, that scenario was speculative and conjectural. . . .
Indeed, plaintiff himself alleges that [the CEO’s] “naked romps” and other forms of
employment discrimination were a “long-standing” practice, and implicitly concedes
that, prior to the Post’s expose, they had had no impact on the Company’s operation.374
The district court’s analysis appears to rest on two premises: first, that executives of
CTPartners reasonably could have believed that allegedly rampant sexual misconduct at the
company would remain under wraps, or if it were disclosed, would not materially affect the
firm’s bottom line; and second, that sexual misconduct at the firm had no impact on the
See supra notes 301-302 and accompanying text.
Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys., Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 2015).
371 Id.
372 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
373 See supra note 293-308 and accompanying text.
374 Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citations
omitted).
369
370

52

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

bottom line in the absence of disclosure. In the wake of the Weinstein revelations and the
rise of #MeToo, both premises are questionable. As more and more companies see their
reputations tarnished and their stock prices plummet in the wake of sexual harassment
revelations, the notion that a company can keep these problems private—or avoid long-term
consequences if sexual misconduct becomes public—grows ever less likely. And the idea
that sexual harassment affects a firm’s bottom line only if it is publicly exposed seems
dubious today. A growing body of research shows that—aside from the direct costs of
litigation and liability—sexual harassment results in higher rates of absenteeism and
employee turnover as well as lower productivity.375 This is especially likely to be true at a
professional services firm such as CTPartners, whose principal asset was its store of human
capital. Note as well that the CTPartners decision is not binding on other district courts (or
even in other cases within the Southern District of New York376), and there are a number of
reasons why other district courts might choose not to follow CTPartners in a future case.
A last line of attack against a company that fails to disclose facts related to corporate
sexual misconduct would be that insofar as the company has paid to settle sexual harassment
claims against a CEO, CFO, or any of its other three highest paid employees, such a
payment qualifies as a “perquisite” that must be disclosed under Item 402.377 According to
SEC guidance, “an item is a perquisite if it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a
personal aspect,” unless it “is integrally and directly related to the performance of the
executive’s duties” or is “generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all
employees.”378 Assuming that a company does not indemnify all of its employees against
sexual harassment claims, would a payment to shield a CEO or other top officer from
personal liability qualify as a “perquisite” under Item 402? Certainly if a company paid
$10,000 or more to provide sexual gratification to its CEO through other means, that
payment would need to be disclosed under SEC regulations.379 Arguably the outcome should
be no different if the company—in effect—allows its CEO to seek sexual pleasure through
the harassment of employees and then pays to clean up the resulting legal mess. But there is
no precedent precisely on point, and so the SEC or a federal court that adopted this theory
of liability would be breaking new ground. Recall, too, that while the SEC can enforce
Regulation S-K on its own, a shareholder-plaintiff still would have to show that the failure to
See Colleen Ammerman & Boris Groysberg, Why Sexual Harassment Persists and What
Organizations Can Do to Stop It, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/whysexual-harassment-persists-and-what-organizations-can-do-to-stop-it (reviewing literature and
concluding that “[s]exual harassment is not a women’s problem but a threat to companies’ health”);
Robert H. Faley et al., Estimating the Organizational Costs of Sexual Harassment: The Case of the
U.S. Army, 13 J. Bus. & Psychol. 461, 462-64 474-76 (1999) (reviewing literature and using data from
U.S. Army to shed further light on productivity- and transfer-related costs); Heather McLaughlin,
Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, The Economic and Career Effects of Sexual Harassment of
Working Women, 31 Gender & Soc’y 333 (2017) (documenting productivity and turnover costs).
376 As a district court decision, CTPartners is not binding precedent in future cases within the same
district or elsewhere. See ATSI Comm’cns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 547 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“District court decisions, unlike the decisions of States' highest courts and federal courts of appeals,
are not precedential in the technical sense . . . .”).
377 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402; supra notes 309-315 and accompanying text.
378 See Securities and Exchange Commission Release 33-8732 (Aug. 11, 2006),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
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disclose such a payment on a Form 10-K renders the company’s filings actionably misleading
under Rule 10b-5.
A more promising path from the perspective of a potential shareholder-plaintiff is to
attack specific statements that a publicly traded company makes with regard to sexual
harassment on the grounds that those statements are inaccurate or misleading. On this point,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hewlett-Packard provides helpful guidance. There, the court
held that Hewlett-Packard’s standards of business conduct—which committed the company
to “high ethical standards”—was “aspirational” and therefore not capable of being
“objectively false.”380 According to the court, “[t]he promotion of ethical conduct at HP did
not reasonably suggest that there would be no violations of the [standards of business
conduct] by the CEO or anyone else.”381 But the court also added that “[t]he analysis would
likely be different” if the company or its executives engaged in misconduct that was revealed,
and then adopted a new code of ethics in response to the earlier misbehavior, and then
“continued the conduct that gave rise to the [initial] scandal while claiming it had learned a
valuable lesson in ethics.”382 Put another way, one incident of misconduct does not render a
company’s code of ethics misleading, but a company that continues to trumpet its ethical
leadership despite knowledge of rampant misbehavior might subject itself to liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The district court decision in CFPartners discussed above383 is consistent with this view.
There, the court held that statements in a company’s code of conduct are “quintessentially
the sort of puffery about corporate reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms
that define the category.”384 But again, this holding does not imply that companies have carte
blanche to hide known sexual harassment allegations behind positive statements about the
company. What it does mean is that shareholder-plaintiffs (or the SEC, in an enforcement
action) will have to identify a specific statement that is more than merely aspirational and
that rises to the level of being materially false or misleading.
Signet Jewelers provides an example of a company that may well face liability under Rule
10b-5 for misrepresentations of material facts related to corporate sexual misconduct.
Probably the strongest securities fraud claims in the Signet lawsuit relate to the company’s
statements regarding ongoing arbitration in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Even
after the exposure of hundreds of sworn employee declarations alleging sexual misconduct in
an EEOC suit, the company continues to say in its quarterly and annual filings that the
claims allege “that [the company’s] U.S. store-level employment practices are discriminatory
as to compensation and promotional activities with respect to gender.”385 That is literally true
as a description of the initial claims, but since March 2008 the plaintiffs’ allegations have
expanded far beyond “store-level employment practices.” As the arbitrator overseeing the
class action said in her opinion certifying the class, the plaintiffs now allege “a corporate
Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d
1268, 1275-77 (9th Cir. 2017).
381 Id. at 1278.
382 See id.
383 See supra notes 172-180 and accompanying text.
384 Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
385 See, e.g., Signet Jewelers Limited, Form 10-Q, at 27 (Nov. 19, 2017),
https://seekingalpha.com/filings/pdf/12411250.pdf.
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culture of gender bias at [Signet], based upon evidence of numerous instances of
inappropriate sexual conduct demeaning to women by executives and managers from the
CEO down.”386 Once the company learned of the extent of the allegations, it was surely
misleading to continue to characterize them as related to “store-level employment practices.”
And given the sharp decline in Signet’s stock price following disclosure of these
allegations,387 it will be difficult for Signet to convince a court or a jury that the omitted facts
fall short of the materiality threshold.
In sum, the viability of securities law claims against companies that fail to disclose the
extent of corporate sexual misconduct will be case-specific. The SEC, which can bring an
enforcement action based on a bare Regulation S-K violation, is likely to have more success
than private plaintiffs, who must prove that the company’s statements or omissions rise to
the Rule 10b-5 level. Moreover, aspirational statements about corporate ethics are less likely
to lead to liability than inaccurate specific statements about ongoing litigation; similarly, even
misleading or false statements may not qualify as material if they pertain to a tiny percentage
of the firm’s total assets or leave the company’s stock price unchanged. Certainly not every
instance of corporate sexual misconduct will be accompanied by liability under federal
securities law, but the pending Signet Jewelers case underscores the fact that securities law
may provide a means for shareholders to win redress in some cases.
5. Damages
So far we have argued that corporations and their officers and directors will—under
certain circumstances—be held liable for engaging in, enabling, and/or concealing sexual
misconduct. But of course, the amount of damages matters as well as the fact of liability. We
anticipate at least five ways in which plaintiffs can show that sexual misconduct has caused
financial harm to the firms in which they hold shares.
First, and most obviously, plaintiffs can point to the direct costs of litigation related to
sexual harassment, including judgments and settlements paid with corporate funds as well as
associated attorneys’ fees. In some cases, the CEO or other corporate officer will be required
to reimburse the company for these costs, but in other instances, liability and litigation
expenses will hit the firm’s bottom line. As noted above, Fox paid $20 million to settle
anchor Gretchen Carlson’s lawsuit against former CEO Roger Ailes,388 and the company
allegedly has paid more than $55 million in total to settle harassment claims.389 These large
sums (larger still when fees are factored in) help to explain the $90 million figure for which
Fox settled the shareholder derivative action against it this past November.390
Second, sexual harassment is a significant cause of employee turnover. One survey of
female law firm associates found that “[e]xperienced or observed sexual harassment” from
male supervisors or colleagues “increases the likelihood that the respondent reported an

See Class Determination Award at 3, Jock v. Sterling, AAA Case No. 11-20-0800-0655 (Feb. 2,
2015), https://www.cohenmilstein.com/sites/default/files/media.5300.pdf.
387 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
388 See Grynbaum et al., supra note 122.
389 See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
390 See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note __.
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intention to quit her current workplace within two years by over 25%.”391 Higher turnover
rates result in direct outlays (for recruiting, hiring, training, and integrating new employees)
as well as indirect costs (including interruptions in production and—potentially—a decline in
morale among remaining employees).392 Plaintiffs can rely on a long literature in the fields of
management and organizational behavior to estimate the effects of increased turnover on
financial performance.393
Third, revelations of sexual misconduct can lead to regulatory consequences for firms.
For example, the Wall Street Journal report documenting Wynn Resorts CEO Steve Wynn’s
decades-long pattern of sexual misconduct triggered regulatory investigations in three
different jurisdictions: Macau, Massachusetts, and Nevada.394 Of particular concern is the
probe in Massachusetts, where Wynn Resorts is building a $2.4 billion property on Boston
Harbor. Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker has stated that he does not believe that
Wynn Resorts would meet the state Gaming Commission’s suitability standard if the
allegations against Wynn are true.395 And while the Gaming Commission, not the Governor,
is the final decisionmaker regarding suitability, the commission has said it will continue to
investigate Wynn Resorts even after its founder’s resignation from the firm.396 If corporate
sexual misconduct leads to the loss of an identifiable business opportunity as a result of
regulatory action, then the associated costs might be added to the award against a liable
fiduciary.
Fourth, corporate sexual misconduct often will have reputational ramifications for
companies. The extent of the damage will depend upon the nature of the business. As noted
above, Signet Jewelers acknowledges that trust is essential to the company’s business
model,397 and the reputational consequences of sexual harassment may be particularly acute
for a company with a primarily female customer base. The reputational consequences of
harassment also may lead current or potential business partners to disassociate themselves
from a firm: for example, after revelations of sexual misconduct by Harvey Weinstein
emerged, Amazon Studios called off a $160 million project to co-produce a series starring
Robert DeNiro and Julianne Moore with the Weinstein Company; Amazon cancelled a series
on Elvis Presley that it had planned to purchase from the firm; and the publisher Hachette

David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job Satisfaction,
Earnings, and Turnover, 51 Indus. & Lab. Rels. Rev. 594, 604 (1998).
392 See Aharon Tziner & Assa Birati, Assessing Employee Turnover Costs: A Revised Approach, 6
Hum. Res. Mgmt. Rev. 113, 116 (1996).
393 For an overview, see Julie L. Hancock et al., Meta-Analytic Review of Employee Turnover as a
Predictor of Firm Performance, 39 J. Mgmt. 573 (2013).
394 Wynn Complaint at 19.
395 See Tori Bedford, Baker: ‘I’m Not the Decision-Maker’ on Casino Mogul Steve Wynn, WGBH
News (Jan. 29, 2018), https://news.wgbh.org/2018/01/29/boston-public-radio-podcast/baker-imnot-decision-maker-casino-mogul-steve-wynn (noting that when asked whether Wynn would meet
the commission’s standard if the allegations turned out to be true, Baker responded: “God, no”).
396 Mark Arsenault, Despite Wynn’s Ouster, State Gaming Panel’s Probe Will Go On, Bos. Globe
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/07/gaming-commissioninvestigation-continue-despite-wynn-ouster/15OXc4MSFTXtShpvgLlGtI/story.html.
397 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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ended an arrangement with Weinstein Company’s book publishing unit.398 Again, damages
will be easier for plaintiffs and courts to quantify when sexual harassment leads to the loss of
identifiable business opportunities.
Fifth, and finally, sexual harassment has undeniable but difficult-to-quantify effects on
productivity at a firm. The most obvious productivity consequences are for victims, who
often become less motivated and more likely to miss work or take sick leave.399 But the
productivity losses associated with sexual harassment are not limited to the victim: several
studies have found “ambient effects” on others in the same workgroup, with harassment
leading to lower morale and lower output across the board.400 This may be the most difficult
component of damages for plaintiffs to quantify, though data on absenteeism rates and
comparisons to other teams at the same firm may shed some light on the magnitude of
productivity harms.
Often, plaintiffs will be able to look to market reactions in order to estimate the effect of
sexual harassment on firm value. A sharp decline in stock price on the day that evidence of
sexual misconduct becomes public is an indication—albeit an imperfect one—of the effect
of misconduct on firm value. This measure is especially common in securities fraud
litigation, though the methodology is vulnerable to misinterpretation if applied without care.
The key point for present purposes is that stock price drops at CTPartners,401 Signet
Jewelers,402 Liberty Tax,403 and Wynn Resorts404 in the wake of sexual harassment
revelations—along with scholarly research regarding the effects of sexual misconduct on
workplaces—point toward the conclusion that the costs of sexual harassment extend far
beyond direct liability and litigation-related expenses. While the measure of damages will
vary from case to case, we anticipate that awards may be quite substantial in certain
circumstances.
D. What Boards Can Do
Our analysis up to this point has approached the problem of corporate sexual
misconduct from the perspective of potential plaintiffs. Here, we switch sides and consider
the problem from the perspective of corporate board members. What can boards do to
reduce the risk of sexual harassment at their firms and to contain the fallout if and when
harassment does occur?
Potential interventions fall into two general categories: ex ante and ex post. By “ex ante,”
we refer to steps that boards can take before an incident of sexual harassment comes to their
Meg James, Amazon Studios Cuts Ties with Weinstein Co. Following Harvey Weinstein Sex
Scandal, L.A. Times (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-amazoncuts-ties-weinstein-co-20171013-story.html.
399 See Chelsea Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and
Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 Personnel Psychol. 127, 137 (2007) (collecting
studies).
400 See id. at 149 (reporting results of meta-analysis).
401 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
402 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
403 See supra note 208and accompanying text.
404 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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attention. By “ex post,” we refer to ways in which boards can and should respond to
harassment once it happens. Our hope is that proactive ex ante steps will obviate the need
for ex post responses. Realistically, though, we recognize that even a firm that implements
the very best practices might not be able to eradicate harassment from its ranks.
Within the category of ex ante measures, the first step is arguably the most obvious: talk
about it. Surprisingly, very few corporate boards have done even that: a 2017 survey of
private and public company directors found that 77 percent of boards “had not discussed
accusations of sexually inappropriate behavior and/or sexism in the workplace.”405
Acknowledging that sexual harassment is a potential business risk marks the beginning of the
process of putting a prevention strategy in place.
Second, boards should take stock of their companies’ past responses to sexual
harassment claims. Beth Boland, a litigator at the law firm Foley & Lardner LLP, has
suggested that boards should “ask for a report of all sexual harassment complaints and
outcomes, with a particular eye toward identifying any repeat offenders within the company’s
ranks—and if those offenders are still with the company, demand a detailed explanation
why.”406 This strikes us as a sensible approach for corporate boards. According to research
by Michael Housman and Dylan Minor, who examined data on more than 50,000 workers
across 11 firms to assess the effects of sexual harassment, workplace violence, and other
“egregious” violations of company policies, so-called “toxic workers”—the ones who
engaged in these behaviors—tended to be more productive than the average employee but
generated negative effects on profitability that far exceeded their contributions.407 In other
words, keeping toxic workers on board tends to be a poor business decision even when
those workers themselves are top performers, and boards should ask tough questions of
managers that choose to retain repeat offenders.
Third, boards should demand that management implement mandatory sexual harassment
training for workers at all levels. A recent survey by the Association for Talent Development
found that 71 percent of employers “offered” sexual harassment prevention training.408 It is
not clear that “offered” means “required,” and in any event, that figure suggests that a
substantial minority of employers provide no sexual harassment prevention training at all.
While there is of course a nontrivial opportunity cost of mandatory training that takes
workers away from their tasks for several hours, the potential benefits for organizations are
substantial. Training appears to affect attitudes (though this of course depends on the
Corporate Boards Aren’t Preparing For Sexual Harassment and Gender Discrimination Issues,
Medium (Oct. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/@theBoardlist/corporate-boards-arent-preparingfor-sexual-harassment-and-gender-discrimination-issues-24ba425d6497.
406 See Beth I.Z. Boland, How Corporate Boards Can Curtail Sexual Harassment, Bos. Globe (Nov.
21, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/11/21/how-corporate-boards-can-curtailsexual-harassment/3PbCNjKYZCsJiMhahOGRxN/story.html.
407 See Michael Housman & Dylan Minor, Toxic Workers (Harvard Business School Working Paper
16-057, Nov. 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-057_d45c0b4f-fa1949de-8f1b-4b12fe054fea.pdf.
408 Megan Cole, 71 Percent of Organizations Offer Sexual Harassment Prevention Training, Ass’n for
Talent Dev. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.td.org/insights/71-percent-of-organizations-offer-sexualharassment-prevention-training.
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content of the training program): for example, one study of federal employees found that
male employees who undergo training are significantly more likely to identify gestures,
remarks, and touching as sexual harassment than their untrained colleagues.409 Moreover,
courts have recognized the existence of a training program as a factor affecting whether an
employer will be held liable for harassment.410 Training thus serves the dual purposes of
prevention and loss mitigation.
Boards should also consider how best to enhance the effectiveness of their training
programs, such as by emphasizing bystander intervention, which teaches employees how to
intervene when they witness harassment.411 To further instill the message that sexual
harassment training should be taken seriously, boards can require that managers from the
CEO on down actively participate in these trainings.
Fourth, boards should review their companies’ procedures for handling complaints. One
clear lesson that has emerged from the scandals of the past several months is that “hotlines”
are not enough: simply establishing a telephone number that employees can call to report
harassment does not ensure that the hotline will be used or that complaints will be
addressed. For example, Twenty-First Century Fox said after allegations against Bill O’Reilly
emerged in 2017 that no employee had ever lodged a hotline complaint against the host.412
But according to former employees of the company, Twenty-First Century Fox made no
efforts to publicize the existence of the hotline, which was staffed by third-party operators
who had no knowledge of company culture.413 A more promising strategy is to appoint an
organizational ombudsperson who receives anonymous and non-anonymous complaints,
works with supervisors to address those complaints, and has authority to report directly to
the board in the event that complaints involve corporate officers or that management
responses appear inadequate.414 By ensuring that serious allegations of sexual misconduct are

See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training Change
Attitudes? A View from the Federal Level 826, 833 (2003). For a review of other studies generally
finding that training increases awareness of and sensitivity to harassment, see Zachary T. Kalinoski et
al., A Meta-Analytic Evaluation of Diversity Training Outcomes, 34 J. Organizational Behav. 1076
(2013).
410 See Michael T. Zugelder, Paul J. Champagne & Steven D. Maurer, An Affirmative Defense to
Sexual Harassment by Managers and Supervisors: Analyzing Employer Liability and Protecting
Employee Rights in the United States, 18 Employee Responsibilities & Rights J. 111, 117 (2006); see
also Setser v. Idaho Home Health & Hospice/LHC Grp., LLC, No. 4:12-CV-00444-EJL-REB, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32957, at *24 (D. Idaho Mar. 11, 2014) (employee training as factor affecting
whether employer satisfies first prong of Farragher-Ellerth test); Sackett v. ITC Deltacom, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 2d 602, 627 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (employee training as factor affecting availability of punitive
damages for Title VII violations).
411 EEOC Select Task Force Study at v. (June 2016).
412 See Noam Scheiber, Anonymous Harassment Hotlines Are Hard to Find and Harder to Trust,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/business/media/fox-sexualharassment-hotline-bill-oreilly.html.
413 See id.
414 On the potential utility of an organizational ombudsperson in responding to sexual harassment
complaints, see Sarah Kessler, Corporate Sexual Harassment Hotlines Don’t Work. They’re Not
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quickly brought to their attention, board members can reduce their own exposure to the risk
of Caremark liability.
Fifth, boards should ensure that company policies specify meaningful consequences for
employees who engage in harassment, perhaps even specifying these consequences in
contracts with top executives. For example, companies could use “morals clauses” that
clearly give the board the right to unilaterally terminate an executive who engages in sexual
harassment or other misconduct.
However, “zero tolerance” policies that promise the termination of all harassers are not a
panacea: as some commentators have suggested, these policies sometimes may deter victims
from reporting low-level harassment (e.g., a single crude joke) that might seem like it should
fall short of a fireable offense.415 Boards should instead empower managers to impose a
range of sanctions—from reprimands to bonus reductions to outright termination—with
rapidly escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Boards also should ensure that employment
contracts with CEOs and other corporate officers do not provide blanket indemnification
for sexual harassment claims.416 One reasonable approach is to state that if a corporate
officer is accused of sexual harassment, the officer will have to pay any judgment or
settlement and associated litigation expenses out of pocket unless the board specifically votes
to indemnify.
Finally, we think that proactive boards should prioritize gender diversity when selecting
new members and choosing a CEO, perhaps implementing a version of the “Mansfield
Rule,” which requires that at least 30% of the candidates considered for leadership and
governance roles are women or people of color. (The rule—adopted by dozens of law firms
and corporate legal departments since its emergence in 2017—is named for Arabella
Mansfield, the first women admitted to practice law in the United States.417) Boards should
encourage management to make gender diversity a priority in selecting lower-level
supervisors as well. Several studies have found that female employees with male supervisors
are more likely to report harassment than female employees with female supervisors.418 And
beyond any claim about the direct effect of gender diversity on harassment, we think that an
increasing awareness of the prevalence of harassment should affect the meritocratic
assessment of candidates for executive and board positions. Indeed, even if one rejects all
Designed To, Quartz at Work (May 2, 2017), https://work.qz.com/971112/corporate-sexualharassment-hotlines-dont-work-theyre-not-designed-to.
415 See Olivia Goldhill, “Zero Tolerance” Sexual Harassment Policies Are Terrible for Women,
Quartz (Nov. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/1125385/zero-tolerance-sexual-harassment-policies-areterrible-for-women.
416 On the prevalence of indemnification clauses in CEO contracts, see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall
S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives
Bargain For?, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 231, 254 n.36 (2006).
417 See Ellen McGirt, How Lawyers Are Working to Change Their Industry’s Diversity Problem,
Fortune (Aug. 30, 2017).
418 See Myrtle P. Bell, Mary E. McLaughlin & Jennifer M. Sequeira, Discrimination, Harassment, and
the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives as Change Agents, 37 J. Bus. Ethics 65, 69 (2002) (collecting
studies).
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claims about the intrinsic or instrumental value of gender diversity, the #MeToo movement
still should inform hiring decisions insofar as it sheds light on the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace and thus reveals the hurdles that female candidates for
executive and board positions have likely had to overcome.419
We acknowledge, of course, that these measures will not reduce the incidence of sexual
harassment to zero at any organization of sufficient size. Yet even ex post (i.e., after a
harassment allegation comes before a corporate board), directors still can take meaningful
steps to avoid liability. Five measures in particular deserve mention.
First, if confronted with allegations that corporate officers engaged in sexual harassment
or that harassment at the company is widespread, boards should hire outside counsel to
conduct a thorough investigation of the claims. Recall that the fact that the ICN board had
conducted such an investigation contributed to the Chancery Court’s conclusion in White v.
Panic that the directors had lived up to their Caremark duties.420 In general, board members
will face liability under Caremark only when they take an ostrich-like approach to misconduct
allegations, and hiring outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation is one obvious
way for directors to extricate their heads from the sand.
Second, when corporate officers are sued for sexual harassment, boards should approve
the use of corporate funds to pay liability- and litigation-related expenses only when an
internal investigation concludes that those claims are unfounded. Otherwise, the charge that
the board allowed for corporate funds to be used to facilitate the officer’s harassment gains
considerable force. This is one area in which ex ante and ex post measures intersect: the
board will, of course, need to ensure that the company has not agreed to a blanket
indemnification policy in its contract with the CEO or other corporate officer.
Third, even when the target of misconduct allegations is a CEO who founded the
company and is intimately associated with the firm’s brand, board members should think
seriously about whether the misconduct allegations rise to the level of a fireable offense—
and should terminate the CEO if they do. In the case of Wynn Resorts, the company’s stock
price rose by 6 percent immediately after the board announced that it had accepted CEO
Steve Wynn’s resignation421—dispelling the myth that investors considered Wynn to be an
indispensable component of the firm. The damage to a firm’s value from losing an iconic
CEO may be far less than the reputational consequences of a high-profile sexual harassment
scandal.
For analogous arguments in the context of race-based affirmative action, see Jerry Kang &
Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 Cal. L. Rev.
1063, 1098-1101 (2006); and Daniel Hemel, An Exam-Grading Hypothetical for Affirmative Action’s
Supreme Court Test, U. Chi. L. Faculty Blog (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/an-exam-grading-hypothetical-for-affirmativeactions-supreme-court-test.html.
420 See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
421 See Kimberly Chin, Wynn Resorts Surges After Billionaire Casino Mogul Steve Wynn Resigns
(WYNN), Bus. Insider (Feb. 7, 2018), http://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/wynnresorts-stock-price-surges-after-billionaire-casino-mogul-steve-wynn-resigns-from-the-company2018-2-1015049099.
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Fourth, board members should think carefully about whether to appoint a special
litigation committee to evaluate actual or potential shareholder derivative actions. As noted
above,422 Delaware courts will hold SLCs to a higher standard for disinterestedness and
independence than they will apply to full boards, and courts will review decisions to reject
demand with less deference. Boards should therefore weigh the viability of a plaintiff’s
argument for demand excusal against the additional vulnerability that comes with the
formation of an SLC. To be sure, a board that would flunk the Aronson or Rales test itself will
generally want to appoint an SLC rather than allowing a shareholder-plaintiff to proceed. But
when the board starts from a strong position, then utilizing an SLC can actually weaken its
hand.
Finally, while our analysis in the previous Section suggests that public companies
generally do not have an affirmative duty to disclose sexual misconduct allegations, boards
should consider whether statements in their SEC filings might be misleading if sexual
misconduct claims emerge. One strategy is to incorporate this factor into any internal
investigation: outside counsel could be asked not only to evaluate the merits of harassment
claims, but also to assess whether any of the company’s public statements require correction
or updating on account of the facts that the investigation reveals. While we would caution
against disclosing the names of victims or any facts that would make those victims easily
identifiable,423 we think that companies would be well-advised to disclose facts beyond the
bare legal minimum so as to reduce the risk of strike suits as well as potentially meritorious
claims.
E. What (Else) Shareholders Can Do
Finally, if boards do not act, shareholders potentially can. In the past few decades,
shareholders have been flexing their muscle not just in litigation, but also in behind-thescenes engagement, proxy contests, and shareholder proposals.424 And because the
shareholder base has grown increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors,
shareholder influence has reached an unprecedented level.425 In the recent past, shareholders
had primarily used their growing power to press for changes in corporate governance and
business strategy, but today, they are increasingly occupied by social issues.
For example, the 2017 proxy season broke the record for the number of environmental
and social (“E&S”) proposals put to a vote.426 Although these proposals received average
support of only 21.4 percent of votes cast, support continues an upward trend. For instance,
in 2016 environmental and social proposals received average support of 19.7 percent of
See supra notes 282-287.
See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
424 See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting ,__ J. of Corp. Law__(2018).
425 See id.; William Bratton & Simone Sepe, Shareholder Power in Incomplete Markets, Working
Paper (2018); Randall Thomas et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1379 (2014).
426 Ramsha Khursheed & Thomas Singer, Environmental Social Proposals in the 2017 Proxy Season,
Harvard Law School Forum for Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/26/environmental-and-social-proposals-in-the-2017proxy-season/.
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votes cast.427 The number of E&S proposals that have won majority support has also
increased over the last few years: six proposals passed in 2017, compared to four in 2016 and
four in 2013.428 These numbers are hardly impressive, but they represent an upward trend
that shows no sign of slowing.
The uptick in successful environmental and social proposals can largely be attributed to a
shift in the voting policies of traditionally passive institutional investors. In 2018, Larry Fink,
the CEO of BlackRock, which manages over $6 trillion in investments in 14,000 companies,
issued an open letter to companies stating his expectations that “companies, both public and
private, serve a social purpose.”429 He also indicated that companies that failed to
demonstrate that they “failed to make a positive contribution to society” would risk losing
the support of BlackRock, one of the largest shareholders of every company in the S&P 500.
Other influential institutional investors, including Vanguard and State Street, have also
begun to support E&S shareholder proposals, including those that ask companies to disclose
business risks related to climate change or enhance employee diversity.
And this newfound interest in social proposals is not limited to large passive institutional
investors; activist hedge funds, too, are taking an interest in E&S issues. For example, in
early 2018, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners joined with the California State Teachers’
Retirement System in pushing Apple’s board to address the growing concern that the iPhone
is addictive and that overuse could cause negative long-term consequences for children.430
Engagement of this type is not unusual for pension funds, but was a first for activist hedge
funds, which tend to focus on corporate governance. And the growth of socially motivated
activist hedge funds reveals the growing sense among investors of all types that
environmental and social factors are value-relevant for companies.431
Sexual harassment policies and procedures are likely to be the next frontier. In January
2018, shareholders from Arjuna Capital and the New York State Common Retirement Fund
announced that they had co-filed shareholder resolutions asking Facebook and Twitter to
produce a “detailed report on the scope of sexual harassment on their platforms and the
remedies either in place or already contemplated for the future.”432 The California Public
Employees’ Retirement system is currently weighing a policy that would urge companies to
disclose settlement payments made to victims of sexual harassment on the behalf of
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432 Selina Wang, Shareholders Press Twitter, Facebook on Sexual Harassment, Bloomberg (Jan. 11,
2018).
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executives and directors.433 These are the first investor proposals to address corporate sexual
harassment, but Arjuna Capital was also behind a shareholder proposal submitted at six of
the largest U.S. financial institutions that asked for detailed reports on the percentage pay
gap between male and female employees.434 Although all of the proposals were unsuccessful
in 2017, Citigroup recently changed its position and agreed to disclose internal data on
gender pay.435
Citi’s change of heart demonstrates the increasing power influence of shareholders
concerned with social issues. In the past, companies could ignore such proposals with
impunity. Such a position is more difficult when the company’s largest shareholders see a
link between social practices and long-term company value and are committed to investing
in companies with ethical practices. We expect that shareholders will increasingly use
shareholder proposals to push for changes in sexual harassment policies at their portfolio
companies, not just asking for disclosure of sexual harassment policies and settlement
payments, but also demanding that firms eliminate forced employee arbitration agreements436
or deny indemnification for sexual harassment claims against corporate executives. By doing
so, shareholders may be able to overcome board resistance to policy changes that would
drive meaningful organizational change.
***
These examples demonstrate the ways in which shareholders can use corporate law to
hold boards and management accountable for sexual harassment. Unlike suits under Title
VII, shareholder suits are not subject to Title VII’s limitations. Shareholders do not face
damage caps or an unusually truncated statute of limitations period. They are also better
positioned to utilize the class action vehicle, and they less likely to have their claims subject
to arbitration.
Shareholder litigation also offers other important benefits. Although shareholder suits
will not make harassment victims whole, the most important result may be the message they
send to other corporate leaders. For example, the case against the Fox News board may
serve to underscore the fact that if corporate directors ignore allegations of sexual
harassment at their companies, they will be subject to consequences—litigation, the risk of
individual liability (and higher insurance premiums), and at the very least, severe reputational
harm. Those consequences, in aggregate, may be large enough to deter those and other
companies from failing to address toxic corporate cultures and discipline harassers. Another
advantage of shareholder litigation may be in securing wide-ranging compliance reforms
along the lines of what Twenty-First Century Fox agreed to in its settlement with
shareholders. Although it is debatable whether such reforms go beyond cosmetic
John Gittelsohn, CalPERS Weighs Push for Sexual-Harassment Corporate Disclosure, Bloomberg
Law (Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/calpers-weighs-push-forsexual-harassment-corporate-disclosure.
434 Arjuna Capital Shareholder Proposal for Gender Pay Equity, https://arjuna-capital.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/C-Shareholder-Proposal_Gender-Pay-Equity-11132018.pdf
435 https://www.ft.com/content/591b0900-f9f9-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167.
436 See, e.g., Nick Wingfield & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual
Harassment
Claims,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
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2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sexual-harassment-arbitration.html.
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compliance,437 the implementation of a workplace council devoted to improving corporate
culture and recruiting women and minorities is certainly a step in the right direction.
In addition, the increased risk of securities liability could encourage companies to more
regularly disclose sexual harassment allegations, as well as payments made to settle such
claims, in their public filings. And the disclosure of material allegations would likely benefit
employees, in addition to investors. Most importantly, heightened disclosure obligations
might encourage companies to do more to prevent workplace sexual harassment to avoid
having to make such disclosures in the first place.438 But there is also the risk that companies
will respond by implementing measures designed to keep allegations from coming to their
attention (although such action could render them vulnerable to a Caremark claim).
Moreover, although employers are required to keep the victim’s name confidential when
reporting the allegations, the prospect of public disclosure could chill employee reporting if
the employee hopes to avoid attention or discussion of the event that triggered the
disclosure. The next Part addresses additional normative and strategic considerations for
shareholders hoping to use litigation as a force for change.
III.

NORMATIVE AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS

We have so far sought to show that corporations and their directors and officers can be
held liable to shareholders for committing, allowing, and/or concealing sexual harassment
under existing law. But of course, “can” does not imply “ought.”439 In this Part, we approach
the issue of corporate law liability for sexual harassment from normative and strategic
perspectives. We consider several possible objections to the use of corporate law as a
mechanism to regulate and remedy workplace-based sexual harassment. While we take these
objections seriously, we ultimately conclude that corporate law has a socially productive role
to play in this domain.
A. Stretching Corporate Law Beyond Its Limits
One argument against the use of corporate law to regulate and remedy sexual harassment
arises from the premise that corporate law should remain focused on its principal
objectives—maximizing shareholder value, protecting investors, and promoting the efficient
allocation of capital—and that involving corporate law in questions of workplace-based
sexual misconduct would divert it from its core mission. (We will refer to this as the
“diversion” argument.) David Lynn, formerly the chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of
Corporate Finance, makes a similar claim in his critique of the Dodd-Frank Act’s disclosure
requirements regarding the use of “conflict minerals” from the Democratic Republic of the
See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
2075 (2016).
438 Cf. Hans Bonde Christensen, Eric Floyd, Lisa Yao Liu, & Mark G. Maffet, The Real Effects of
Mandated Information on Social Responsibility in Financial Reports: Evidence from Mine-Safety
Records, 64 J. Accounting & Econ. (2017) (examining the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
requirement that companies disclose purchases of war minerals from Congo, as well as evidence of
mine health, and concluding that such disclose improved safety performance by shaming managers
and because of shareholder distaste for socially irresponsible companies).
439 The converse may be true, at least as a matter of analytic philosophy. See, e.g., Gideon Yaffe,
‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 59 Analysis 218 (1999).
437
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Congo,440 payments to governments for resource extraction rights,441 violations of mine
health and safety rules.442 Lynn notes that these rules “were borne out of discrete public
policy concerns” and not “in accordance with the mission of the SEC to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”443 We can
anticipate an analogous argument in the sexual harassment context: corporate law should be
focused on maximizing shareholder value and protecting investors and markets—not on
protecting employees from workplace-based sexual misconduct. The latter objective, while
certainly a worthy one, is better addressed through alternative mechanisms.
There are (at least) three potential rebuttals to the diversion argument. One is to
challenge the claim that the core objectives of corporate law are (or should be) maximizing
shareholder value, protecting investors, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital. A
second line of attack would assume, arguendo, that the above-listed aims are and should be
the principal purposes of corporate law but would posit that corporate law can nonetheless
pursue secondary goals without running off the rails. A third approach is to argue that
regulating and remedying sexual misconduct by corporate executives is entirely consistent
with the traditional goals of corporate law.
The first line of attack centers on one of the most fundamental debates in corporate
law—whether the principal goal of corporate law is (or should be) to maximize shareholder
welfare. While Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman observed in 2001 that “[t]here is no
longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to
increase long-term shareholder value,”444 other views are increasingly prevalent.445 For
example, Lynn Stout advances the view that while profit-maximization (and thus,
shareholder wealth maximization) is necessary for the firm’s long-term survival, it is not the
only corporate objective. In her view, once profitability is achieved, the firm should relax its

15 U.S.C. § 78m(p).
Id. § 78m(q).
442 Id. § 78m-2.
443 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities
Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 327, 330-31 (2011).
444 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439,
439 (2001). The view that the corporate purpose should be to maximize shareholder wealth emerged
in 1932, when Adolph Berle famously responded to an essay written by Gardinier Means advancing
the opposite view. See William Bratton, Berle and Means Considered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J.
Corp. L. 737 (2001), However, a 1970 New York Times op-ed by Milton Friedman championing
shareholder primacy kicked off the modern view, that shareholder wealth maximization should be
the norm. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 13, 1970) (arguing that corporate executives have a “responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which will generally be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied
in ethical custom.”).
445 See, e.g., Einer Elhague, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
733 (2005); Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive
Possibilities (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653 (2010); Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012).
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focus on shareholder wealth, and commit instead to satisfying other goals, such as managing
risk and taking care of investors, employees, customers, and society at large.446
But even if the shareholder primacy premise is accepted, there is a growing awareness
that shareholders desire something more than wealth, and that shareholder “value” therefore
encompasses more than pure wealth-maximization. Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales have
recently advanced the idea that managers should pursue a broad agenda that encompasses
shareholders’ prosocial aims.447 They also contend that shareholders should use their voting
rights to signal their prosocial desires to management.448 Derivative and securities actions
against corporate directors and officers who commit, allow, or conceal sexual harassment
could serve as one way for shareholders to signal their prosocial objectives and to hold
management accountable for antisocial behavior.
Moreover, even if shareholder wealth maximization is accepted as the principal goal of
corporate law, an area of law can have a primary purpose while still advancing a number of
secondary aims. Indeed, even Milton Friedman believed that a corporation should adhere to
ethical standards when maximizing shareholder welfare.449 And hybrid purposes are not
unique to this area of law. For example, the primary purpose of federal income tax law is—
uncontroversially—to raise revenue for the United States government, and yet federal
income tax law is also used to advance a wide variety of objective aside from revenue-raising
(e.g., promoting homeownership,450 charitable contributions,451 retirement saving,452 and the
development of orphan drugs453). Likewise, the primary purpose of evidence law is—at least
arguably—to promote the accurate determination of facts at trial, but no one would dispute
that evidence law also seeks to advance and protect a number of other interests (e.g.,
promoting trust among attorneys and clients, as well as among doctors and patients).454 The
notion that corporate law can pursue only one or a small set of objectives stands in tension
with the reality that many areas of law serve plural purposes while still more or less achieving
their principal goals.
Yet one need not reject the premise that corporate law should remain focused on a small
set of core objectives in order to embrace the normative claim that corporate law should be
used to regulate and remedy workplace-based sexual misconduct. This is the nub of the third
rebuttal to the diversion argument: workplace-based sexual misconduct does reduce
Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, supra note 445. But see Leo Strine Jr., Making It Easier for
Directors to “Do The Right Thing”?, 4 Harv. B. L. Rev. 235 (2015).
447 Hart & Zingales, supra note 30.
448 Id.
449 Friedman, supra note 444.
450 See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (deduction for home mortgage interest), Stout, The Shareholder
Value Myth, supra note 445.
451 See id. § 170 (charitable contribution deduction).
452 See id. § 401(k) (allowing employers to establish defined contribution plans, with contributions
and accretions excluded from employee income until distribution); § 402A (allowing for Roth 401(k)
plans); § 408 (IRAs); § 408A (Roth IRAs).
453 See id. § 45C (50% credit for clinical testing expenses for drugs to treat or cure rare diseases or
conditions).
454 For one perspective on the purposes of evidence law, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477 (1999).
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shareholder value, harm investors, and interfere with the efficient allocation of capital. It
reduces shareholder value most directly when corporate funds are used to pay judgments,
settlements, and attorneys’ fees in employment discrimination cases, but that is only one
among a number of ways in which sexual misconduct by a corporation’s executives and
employees harms the corporation’s investors. Avoiding these results—or penalizing
corporate fiduciaries for allowing these results to transpire—is entirely within corporate law’s
central ambit.
B. Discursive Harms
Apart from any worry as to the overextension of corporate law, the prospect of
corporate law liability in cases of sexual harassment raises a separate concern regarding the
discursive consequences of framing sexual harassment in terms of the injury to shareholders.
Even if one believes that sexual harassment results in the misallocation of human capital and
the misuse of corporate resources, these harms are most certainly secondary to the victim’s
injury. Overemphasizing the harm to shareholders and to markets runs the risk of equating
the negative economic externalities of sexual harassment with the human tragedy that
victims endure. Relatedly, framing sexual harassment in terms of harm to shareholders might
be criticized as commodifying the employees who bear the brunt of sexual harassment’s
costs.
An historical analogy to the tort law treatment of sexual assault in the nineteenth century
illustrates the potential dignitary harms that stem from characterizing a sexual attack on one
person as an economic injury to another. As Reva Siegel notes, “[a]t common law, sexual
assault gave rise to an action for damages insofar as it inflicted an injury on a man’s property
interest in the woman who was assaulted.”455 For example, the rape of a slave might give rise to a
trespass claim by the master; impregnation might give rise to a seduction claim by the
pregnant woman’s father. The abolitionist and women’s rights activist Lydia Maria Child
wrote that the “miserable legal fiction” requiring a woman to “acknowledge herself the
servant of somebody” in order to visit common law consequences on her attacker was a
“standing insult to womankind.”456
We can anticipate a somewhat similar critique of efforts to use corporate law liability to
regulate and remedy workplace-based sexual harassment. Just as the rhetoric surrounding
common law actions for seduction and trespass suggested that fathers, husbands, and
masters were the ones harmed by sexual assault, shareholder derivative actions arising from
sexual harassment might be seen as suggesting that investors—rather than the employees
who suffer through sexual harassment firsthand—are the victims whose injuries require
redress. Moreover, the claim that workplace-based sexual harassment damages shareholders
through the misallocation of human capital might be interpreted to imply that the female
employees of publicly traded corporations are themselves corporate assets.

Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in Directions in Sexual
Harassment Law 5-6 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2008).
456 Lydia Maria Child, Letter from New York, No. V, Bos. Courier, Feb. 6, 1844, at 2, reprinted
in 9 The Universalist Union 218, 219 (P. Price ed., Albany Universalist Union Press 1844) (check
cite).
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A commitment to discursive purity would, however, implicate much more than the use
of corporate law to regulate and remedy sexual harassment—it would cast doubt on Title
VII itself. The Supreme Court held the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lay within Congress’s
constitutional authority because of discrimination’s “direct and adverse effect on the free
flow of interstate commerce.”457 This holding has attracted criticism from some scholars
who argue that discrimination should be actionable regardless of whether it affects
commerce, but federal employment discrimination law continues to be grounded in the
rationale that discrimination is bad for business.458 If the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to address sexual harassment can survive the commodification critique, then presumably the
use of corporate law can too.
The fact that the social meaning of corporate legal liability in cases of sexual harassment
is potentially plastic further lessens concerns about discursive harm. By this, we mean that
the imposition of corporate law liability can be interpreted in multiple ways, and that various
actors will have opportunities to influence the direction that such interpretation takes. From
one vantage point, liability would reinforce the view that successful companies are ones that
make it possible for all of their employees—regardless of gender—to thrive, and that
directors and officers who allow sexual harassment to occur at their firms have failed in a
fundamental respect. By that same token, the imposition of liability on individuals other than
the harasser may communicate that harassment is the product of a systemic failure, with
systemic consequences,459 and that responsibility can be attributed to groups of individuals
rather than a single harasser. The social meaning of corporate law liability is not fixed in
stone, and attorneys, judges, journalists, and shareholders will shape that social meaning
through the language that they deploy.
We acknowledge the uncomfortable reality that shareholders will sometimes recover
damages arising out of harassment scandals while the victims will be left emptyhanded.
However, this is not a reason to abandon corporate law, but a reminder that corporate law
will always be a complement to, rather than a substitute for, legal protections designed to
compensate victims. In sum, concerns about the discursive consequences of corporate law
liability ought not deter lawyers, shareholders, and activists from pursing this course, but it is
important that practitioners remain cognizant of the messages that liability might send.
Reliance on corporate law runs the risk of diverting attention away from victims and
contributing to commodification of female employees, but that is a reason to think carefully
about the words we use to articulate corporate law claims—not a compelling reason to call
off the enterprise altogether.
C. Distributional Considerations
A separate worry regarding the use of corporate law to regulate and remedy workplacebased sexual harassment is that this approach privileges certain classes of employees above
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964)
See generally George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the
Shifting Source of Civil Rights Law, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1551 (2012).
459 For a discussion of other third-party effects that result from sexual harassment, see Nancy Leong,
Them Too, Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118040.
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others. Insofar as top executives at publicly traded companies engage in sexual harassment,
the victims are likely to be other relatively well-compensated professionals rather than the
rank-and-file. Sexual harassment is endemic in blue-collar work environments as well as
white-collar ones. Corporate law liability might not have much to offer employees of smaller
businesses, or even lower-level employees of publicly traded companies whose own
experiences of sexual harassment are so far removed from the company’s top executives that
it would be difficult to demonstrate the enterprise-wide harm necessary to hold the latter
liable.
Our response to this concern is threefold. First, we can imagine circumstances in which
a company’s failure to address sexual harassment among lower-level employees would give
rise to liability under fiduciary duty or securities laws. As discussed, Signet Jewelers provides
one example. The recently revealed pattern of sexual harassment at Ford Motor Company
plants in Chicago may be another case in point.460 Second, norms at the top of the corporate
hierarchy likely influence behavior several rungs below. Research on management and
organizational behavior identifies similar “trickle down” effects in related contexts.461 Third,
even if reliance on corporate law liability does have differential effects at higher and lower
rungs of the corporate hierarchy, that in itself is not necessarily a reason to reject the
approach. Rather, it is a reason to explore alternative mechanisms (discussed in Section
III.E) to supplement the deterrent effects of corporate law liability at lower levels.
D. Backfire
A further concern—which arises any time that penalties for sexual harassment are
ratcheted upwards—is that male employers will respond in ways that redound to the
detriment of female employees. (We frame this concern in heteronormative terms because
we think it is particularly likely to manifest itself when potential perpetrators and victims
occupy traditional gender roles, though we also emphasize that sexual harassment is not an
exclusively male-against-female phenomenon.) Male executives may be more reluctant to
hire female employees—or may be more reluctant to play a mentor role with respect to
female employees—if they are worried about potential harassment allegations, and those
worries may become even more salient if the existing employment discrimination penalties
for sexual harassment are supplemented by other forms of liability. This “Mike Pence
effect”—so named on account of the Vice President’s reported refusal to dine alone with
any woman other than his wife—is arguably the most serious potential unintended
consequence of the #MeToo movement’s successes.462

See Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It To Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask
Women
at
Ford,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html.
461 See, e.g., David M. Mayer et al., How Low Does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a TrickleDown Model, 108 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 1 (2009); Bennett J. Tepper & Edward
C. Taylor, Relationships Among Supervisors’ and Subordinates’ Procedural Justice Perceptions and
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors, 46 Acad. Mgmt. J. 97 (2003).
462 See, e.g., Katherine Tarbox, Is #MeToo Backlash Hurting Women’s Opportunities in Finance?,
Harvard Business Review (March 12, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/is-metoo-backlash-hurtingwomens-opportunities-in-finance; Melinda Newman, Why the #MeToo Movement Could Have
Chilling Effect for Women in Music Industry, Billboard (Dec. 14, 2017),
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Yet even as the law potentially gives rise to this response, the legal system has responses
of its own to this concern. For one, systematically excluding female employees from
positions of proximity to top executives is itself a violation of employment discrimination
law. Along those lines, some of the same theories that might support director and officer
liability in cases of sexual harassment also would support liability if it came to light that the
company had shut the C-suite door to female employees in order to manage the risk of
sexual harassment allegations.463 The argument that we should refrain from penalizing
executives for behaving illegally because they might respond by behaving illegally is, we
think, a weak one.
To be sure, Title VII might not encompass more subtle forms discrimination, such as a
failure to mentor, that may result from an increased risk of corporate liability. But there are
several responses to this concern. First, that risk is present with respect to all employment
discrimination protections, and if the risk is not a sufficient basis to ratchet down
protections under Title VII and similar statutes, then it is difficult to see why it would be a
reason to back away from the use of corporate law to regulate and remedy sexual
harassment. Second, to the extent that backfire results because employees are worried about
mistakenly or falsely being accused of harassment, the success and visibility of the #MeToo
movement may reduce this risk by clarifying the standards of acceptable workplace behavior.
Third and finally, the “market for mentorship” is not one-sided; mentees seek out mentors,
too. And a legal regime that penalizes inappropriate behavior and empowers junior
employees to bring harassment claims might actually make those junior employees more
likely to seek out senior male mentors and enhance mentorship opportunities for them. This
is not to dismiss the backfire concern out of hand; it is to say that the benefits of increased
legal protection almost certainly outweigh the costs.
E. Alternative Mechanisms
Even if one accepts that regulating and remedying workplace-based sexual misconduct
through corporate law could have positive consequences, one still might question whether
corporate law is the best tool to achieve these ends. Why not focus instead on alternative
mechanisms, such as federal and state employment discrimination law? Surely reforms to
these areas of law would address the problem of workplace-based sexual misconduct more
directly than corporate law liability would.
We readily acknowledge that corporate law ought not be the only—nor the primary—
mechanism for addressing the problem of workplace-based sexual misconduct. Moreover,
nothing in this Article should be read to suggest that corporate law is the most effective
means of regulating or remedying sexual harassment. While a comprehensive analysis of
Title VII reform options lies well beyond our present scope, the analysis above suggests a
number of ways in which the federal employment discrimination regime might be revised to
better achieve its aims. For example, the 180-day period for filing a charge with the EEOC
could be extended in sexual harassment cases to reflect the reality that victims often are
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8070562/metoo-movement-women-music-industryimpact.
463 See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003 (“[O]ne cannot act loyally as a
corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.”).
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reluctant to come forward on their own.464 Moreover, Title VII’s caps on compensatory and
punitive damages could be raised—or, at least, adjusted for inflation.465 In the absence of
congressional action, state legislators could take the lead by passing laws providing for longer
limitations periods and higher or unlimited damages.
More creative solutions might involve the use of what Ian Ayres and Cait Unkovic have
termed “information escrow” arrangements,466 now being implemented on some college
campuses for sexual assault cases through the Callisto app.467 Callisto allows victims to report
their experiences of sexual assault and to keep those reports confidential until another victim
lodges a report with respect to the same perpetrator. When two victims have reported
assaults by the same perpetrator, the institution receives the contact information of each
victim and the victims are themselves told that there has been a match.468 One might imagine
a state-level equivalent that applies to workplace-based sexual misconduct: victims could
lodge confidential complaints with the state human rights agency, and once multiple victims
have reported instances of harassment or assaults by the same perpetrator, each victim
would be informed, and a new limitations period would run from that date.
Beyond federal and state employment discrimination and civil rights law, tort law and tax
law might have a role to play in regulating and remedying sexual harassment. Victims of
sexual harassment have had some (limited) success bringing tort law claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress,469 assault, and battery.470 Some authors have argued for a
See, e.g., Danny Cevallos, Sex Misconduct Cases Spur Rethinking of Statute of Limitations, NBC
News (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/sex-misconductcases-spur-rethinking-statute-limitations-n822286.
465 The $300,000 cap for large employers in 1991 is equivalent to more than $537,000 today, based on
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI
Inflation Calculator, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2017);
cf. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-116, § 1997A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a).
466 See Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 145 (2012).
467 Laura Bassett, How a New Technology Could Help Find the Next Harvey Weinstein, Huffington
Post
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/callisto-rape-reportingapp_us_59df86c7e4b0eb18af06d54e.
468 What We Do, Callisto, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
469 Jessica Stander & Roberta Steele, Employment Torts 2-3 (ABA Section of Labor & Employment
Law—2009 Labor and Employment Law CLE Conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 2009) (“Most
courts recognize that ordinary employment suits involving sexual discrimination will not establish a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. . . . However, some courts have held
that egregious sexual harassment may rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”); see, e.g., Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 611, 613-14 (5th
Cir. 1999) (sufficient evidence to support verdict against supervisor for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where employee testified that supervisor “harassed her with constant sexual
remarks, invited her to his house for a ‘hot body oil massage,’ told her to undress so he could lick her
from head to toe, asked her to leave her husband and have his child, followed her after work, asked
her to go to Las Vegas with him, and sometimes came up behind her and licked or kissed her face or
neck”).
470 Stander & Steele, supra note 5, at 9; see, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1439
(10th Cir. 1997) (battery); Rudas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 96-5987, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1997) (assault and battery).
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more expansive freestanding tort for sexual harassment.471 The #MeToo movement might
give new momentum to the push for such a tort to be recognized. Tax law, meanwhile, is
already being used to discourage confidential settlements of sexual misconduct claims, which
potentially allow perpetrators to escape public exposure.472 Specifically, the Republicanbacked tax legislation signed into law by President Trump in December 2017 includes a
provision that denies a deduction for amounts paid to settle sexual harassment and abuse
claims if such settlement is subject to a nondisclosure agreement.473 And aside from tax law,
several other policy levers remain available for addressing the specific problem of
confidential sexual harassment settlements. As Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan have
suggested, attorneys could be required under professional responsibility rules to report such
non-disclosure agreements to authorities or vulnerable third parties; courts could refuse to
enforce such agreements; and/or jurisdictions could impose mandatory disclosure
requirements as to some or all information concerning these settlements.474
Importantly, however, the availability of alternative mechanisms for addressing problems
related to workplace sexual misconduct does not make corporate law an irrelevant—or
undesirable—tool in the fight against sexual harassment. First, the problem of sexual
harassment appears to be so prevalent and pervasive that multiple policy tools will be needed
in the effort to eradicate sexual misconduct from the workplace (and even then,
“eradication” is almost certainly an unrealistic goal). Second, these various tools may be
complements rather than substitutes. For example, if securities law forces publicly traded
companies to disclose large sexual harassment settlements or allegations against executives,
those revelations—insofar as they supply further evidence of the problem’s prevalence—
may add further fuel to the push for legal reform.
Third, whereas most other policy responses to sexual misconduct in the workplace
would require legislative action, corporate law can be used to address the problem without
See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 446, 45051 & n.38, 526 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L.
Rev. 691, 769 & n.407 (1997); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A
Defective Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol’y J. 333, 359-65 (1990); Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A
Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461 (1986).
Catherine MacKinnon has argued that treating sexual harassment as a tort is “inadequate” because it
fails to recognize the inherent element of economic coercion. See MacKinnon, supra note __, at 173.
472 On confidentiality clauses in settlements of sexual misconduct cases, see generally Saul Levmore
& Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103
Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018).
473 An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and IV of the Concurrent Resolution
on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-__, § 13307, __ Stat. __ (2017) (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 162(q)). On some of the ambiguities in that provision, see Leandra Lederman, Are Sexual
Harassment Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees Inadvertently Disallowed by the Tax Cuts Bill?, Surly
Subgroup (Dec. 19, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/12/19/are-sexual-harassmentplaintiffs-attorneys-fees-inadvertently-disallowed-by-the-tax-cuts-bill. For a proposal to deny a tax
deduction for confidential sexual misconduct settlements that preceded the emergence of the
Weinstein allegations and the Republican tax plan, see Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, SemiConfidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921059 (manuscript at 29-32).
474 See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 472 (manuscript at 26-29).
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any change to existing law. As we argue in Part II, corporate directors and officers who
commit, allow, or conceal workplace-based sexual misconduct can be held liable under the
fiduciary duty laws of Delaware and other states, and publicly traded companies can be held
liable under federal securities law for misleading investors about workplace sexual
misconduct in certain circumstances. Convincing federal and state court judges of those
propositions is probably a lighter lift than persuading federal and state lawmakers to enact
new statutes. And convincing one or a handful of the approximately 3,700 publicly listed
companies in the United States to adopt a shareholder resolution requiring disclosure of
sexual harassment settlements may be a more plausible short-term objective than nationwide
legislative change.475
IV.

CONCLUSION

Our focus in this Article has been on the role of corporate law in regulating and
remedying workplace-based sexual misconduct. We have argued that corporate fiduciaries
who engage in, enable, and/or ignore sexual harassment at their companies will be liable to
shareholders under specific circumstances. We also have highlighted the ways in which
publicly traded companies contending with sexual harassment scandals can—if not careful—
run afoul of federal securities laws. And we have argued that corporate law, while certainly
not the only legal tool for addressing the widespread problem of workplace sexual
misconduct, can play a positive role in advancing the #MeToo movement’s objectives,
though we also caution that advocates for liability should be aware of and attentive to the
discursive and distributional consequences of their efforts.
Not only does corporate law have important implications for the fight against sexual
harassment, but the #MeToo movement also—we think—has important implications for
corporate law. Perhaps the “history” of corporate law is over, as Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman provocatively proclaimed in 2001, and maybe the claim that corporate law
“should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value” has won the day.476 But
even if that is so (and we are far from sure that it is477), the question of how to maximize
long-term shareholder value still will be contested, and corporate law will continue to
provide a forum in which that contest is waged. Social movements influence the evolution of
ideas about investment and management, and now, we are seeing that evolution in real time.
Ultimately, the impact of shareholder suits arising out of corporate sexual misconduct
will not be measurable in terms of dollars recovered. Indeed, one can be skeptical in general
about derivative actions and securities fraud lawsuits as mechanisms for compensation and
specific deterrence while also retaining hope that litigation will serve a useful role here.478 For
Cf. Schumpeter: Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, The
Economist (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21721153-companyfounders-are-reluctant-go-public-and-takeovers-are-soaring-why-decline (reporting that the number
of listed companies in the United States is 3,671).
476 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 439.
477 See supra note 445-446 and accompanying text.
478 For classic (and empirically grounded) statements of such skepticism, see Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L. & Econ. Org. 55 (1991); and Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev.
497 (1991).
475

74

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147130

one, shareholder lawsuits against corporate fiduciaries who commit, enable, ignore, or
conceal sexual harassment chip away at a public/private divide that places the sexual
behavior of executives entirely—and in our view, incorrectly—on the private side. What a
CEO does behind closed doors is the board’s business, at least when the CEO exploits
employees (as in, e.g., the Wynn case), when the CEO’s romantic interests cause him to favor
some employees over others (as allegedly occurred at Liberty Tax), or when a CEO’s
behavior generates legal risk for the company. So too, shareholder suits can emphasize that
executives’ behavior toward lower-level employees matters not only for civility but also for
firm productivity. Even if indemnification and insurance shield most defendants from
personal liability, shareholder actions can serve to redefine the responsibilities of corporate
fiduciaries and clarify that the prevention of sexual harassment is a critical component of
good governance.
There are, concededly, costs to using corporate law for these purposes. Aside from the
direct costs of litigation (which in the end may be borne by shareholders), there is—as we
acknowledge—a potentially serious cost in recasting shareholders as sexual harassment’s
victims when of course the direct impact on the harassee is orders of magnitude more
severe. We are nonetheless optimistic that a changing litigation environment will make
individuals in positions of power more attentive to the lived experiences and longlasting
injuries of harassment’s foremost victims—and more committed toward preventing it from
happening again. That, more than any settlement or verdict, will be the final and most
significant metric of success.
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